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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent

Case No. 13959

-vsKENNETH LEE STANDROD,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was the consolidated trial of two Informations
filed in Kane County, Utah, each of which charged appellant with
the crime of first degree murder in violation of Sec. 76-5-202,
Utah Code Annot.(19 53) , alleging that he intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Thomas Earl Morris and Teresa Clair
Beaty and at the time of each of said killings committed another
homicide.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a jury trial of some twelve days in the District
Court of Kane County, defendant, on March 8, 19 74, was found
guilty of murder in the first degree in both cases.

On March

8th, 1974, following a penalty hearing before the Court, a jury
having been waived, appellant was sentenced to the Utah State

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Prison for life and commitment issued forthwith.

(R.73).*

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of his convictions and an Order
remanding the cases for new trial or, in the alternative, an Order
remanding the cases to the District Court of the Sixth Judicial
District, Kane County, State of Utah, on a charge of manslaughter
and requiring that Court to sentence appellant for that offense.
' STATEMENT OF FACTS
At some time in the middle of the day on October 20,
1973, two persons were killed at a cabin owned by appellant at
Navajo Lake Estates in Kane County.

There is little conflict

in the evidence adduced at trial (from the other persons present,
i.e., appellant, Candice Earle, Layton Roselund, Paul Kunzel,
and Richard Higgins) concerning the events which occurred on the
day prior to and the morning of the deaths.

Thus, no inappropriate

liberty will be taken by omitting extensive references to the transcript in describing those events. Appellant had become engaged
to marry Candice Earle and had determined to build a home at Navajo
Lake Estates.

In September Standrod had met Layton Roselund and

Paul Kunzel and had made an agreement with them to the effect that
he would basically support them in exchange for their labor in
helping him build the cabin.

Subsequently, on approximately Sept-

ember 20th, Standrod met Richard Higgins in Las Vegas and made
a similar agreement with him.

Thus, during late September and

October, Higgins, Kunzel, Roselund, Earle and Standrod were together
at the cabin site.

One

on varying occasions.

or two other individuals were also there

According to Earle, Standrod and Roselund

had gone to Las Vegas to finish moving their belongings and to
*",fRn designations will hereinafter refer to the Record on Appeal.
"T" designations
will hereinafter refer to the Reporters Transcript.
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acquire supplies for the cabin for the winter, and on October 19,
19 74 they began the return trip in a rented U-Haul truck.

Just

outside of Las Vegas they saw two hitchhikers and Mr. Roselund
suggested that they pick them up.

After some discussion during

which the hitchhikers introduced themselves as Lonely Cloud (Tom
Morris) and Teresa, it was agreed the hitchhikers would ride in
the back of the truck.

Standrod was solicitous of the hitchhikers

during the trip, purchasing food, vodka (for them to celebrate
their engagement), and other creature comforts.

They arrived at

the cabin, where Kunzel and Higgins were already present, just
before midnight.

After introductions had been made and a short

period of conversation, everyone decided to go to bed.

Teresa

and Tom were apparently to sleep in the living room of the cabin
on a foam mattress.

Just prior to retiring Teresa said something

to the effect of "Who's coming to bed with me n and Tom responded,
"It had better not be anyone but me"

(T.711, 1132).

It would

appear that Rick Higgins and Paul Kunzel slept in the kitchen area
of the cabin adjacent to Tom and Teresa (T.1132).
Upon rising at dawn the next morning some breakfast was
eaten and at about that time Standrod placed on the kitchen table
of the cabin a quantity of a drug which everyone thought was T.H.C.
(Tetra-Hydro-Canabanol) and he, Layton Roselund, and Candice Earle,
all ingested some by "snorting" (T.1138).

At about this time Kunzel

and Higgins "snorted" some cocaine,(T.1011). Thus, apart from
the victims, everyone at the cabin site was, during the 20th of
October, under the influence of mind altering drugs.
On the way to the cabin the night before there had been
conversation about the fact that deer season was opening the next
morning.

Standrod had seen a dead deer in the roadway and wanted
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to post "No Hunting" signs at the spring near his cabin to alert
hunters that it was a residental area and firing of weapons could
be dangerous.

Hence that morning Standrod, Roselund, and Morris

decided to go to the spring and do what they could to secure the
safety of the premises.

•

As Morris and Standrod proceeded towards the spring
(which was some 400 yards from the house) Roselund went off somewhere on his own and was separated from them for approximately
one-half hour to forty-five minutes (T.940).
Higgins stated that while the others had gone to the
spring, he went into a room under the front porch of the cabin
to work on a window (T.672).

Kunzel indicated that he was working

on a porch at the back of the cabin (T.840).

Roselund met Stand-

rod, and Tom on the way back from the spring, and they all returned
to the house at approximately 11:00 or 11:15 (T.942).

All three

individuals were armed when they left for the spring and were
still armed on their return to the house, Tom with a ,357 Magnum
which he was wearing on his hip (T.1024); Roselund with a 30-30
rifle, which he placed by the door to the deck (T.1023); and
Standrod with a M-l Carbine.
Upon the return from the spring, Roselund indicated
that he went to work carrying items out of the downstairs room
to the truck

(T.946).

He indicated that during this time he

was not aware of Higgins working in the downstairs room (T.1032).
Apparently, upon the return, Standrod met Candice on the front
porch of the cabin which was immediately outside the living room
(T.1036), and remained there until the killings occurred

(T.1145-

1151).
In summary, and to place the individuals at this time,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
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Pvoselund was apparently on his way from the cabin to the truck,
Candice Earle and Standrod were on the front porch, Paul Kunzel
was supposedly working on the back porch, Teresa was lying in
the living room (and while no one recalls specifically, everyone
assumed that Morris was with her), and Higgins claims that he
was on route from the downstairs room for the purpose of obtaining
a tape measure, (T.672). At this point it is appropriate to analyze
the stories on an individual basis.
Rick Higgins testified that at approximately 1:30 p.m.
he went from the downstairs up into the cabin to find a tape measure
(T.672).

He didn't see Earle or appellant on the front porch

(T.730), nor appellant in the cabin as he went inside (T.672),
but was aware that Teresa and Morris were lying down (T.731).
He proceeded midway into the cabin and was facing north looking
for a tape measure when he heard shots (T.731).

He turned around,

heard a few more shots and saw flames coming from a weapon (T.673).
It was appellant that he

!T

appeared to see at the time" (T.732),

holding the weapon in front of the —

parallel with the bodies,

facing towards the bodies" (T.673), both of whom were lying on
the foam rubber mattress in the living room.

Higgins said that

Standrod i\ras standing at a position from which Morris was slightly
to his right and Beaty was slightly to his left, and the victims
were prostrate facing each other (T.673).

Higgins said that he

"couldn't be dead positive" that Standrod was doing the firing
(T.799), his reservation growing out of the fact that he was "high"
and "under the influence of drugs" (T.813).

The rounds were fired

at a distance of two feet from the feet of the victims (T.811)
and he he was not sure what kind of weapon it was.

He was aware

that there was a hole in the girl's right temple and also observed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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numerous wounds in the mid-section of the boy CT.674-5),

Immedi-

ately after the shooting Higgins, Standrod and Earle went out on
the front porch (T.675) and Higgins stated that he then went under
the cabin and had a conversation with Roselund (T.675).

Thereafter,

he talked to Paul Kunzel, and went with him to the trailer for
a period of approximately one-half hour before he returned to the
cabin (T.676).
was

The first time he saw Kunzel after the shooting

ff

right when I stepped out on the porch; he was coming from

the west side of the cabin,T (T.788).
Paul Kunzel testified that he was working on the back
porch on the north end of the cabin. He said he heard shots and
surmised it was someone target practicing off the front porch
(T.845).

When he heard the shots he was reminded that he had

left a shotgun leaning against a tree in the back of the cabin.
He didn't think there was any need for the shotgun being outside,
so he recovered the shotgun and entered the cabin through the north
door.

As he entered, he saw Standrod standing near the south door

of the cabin with a Mstrangen look on his face (T.845).

Kunzel

continued toward the south end of the cabin "where I was going to
place the gun and as I was placing the gun down,lf heard Standrod
say something to the effect of, "So what, you've got a little blood
on youn.

At that point he noticed Standrod

lf

gazing in the direction

of the bodies and Candice standing behind him with a very astonished
look on her face" (T.846).

Kunzel noticed the wounds, realized

what had happened and walked out the south door of the cabin about
thirty feet away.

Kunzel saw Standrod ten feet from the victims'

feet (T.847), didn't notice him holding a weapon (T.847), and was
not aware of any peculiar smell in the room (T.909).

It was no

more than one minute from the time Kunzel heard the shots until
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he got inside the cabin (T.904).

Upon exiting the south door he

observed Roselund coming up from the lower area with Higgins behind
him (T.849).
Layton Roselund was engaged in carrying materials from
the room under the front porch of the cabin to a truck at the time
the killings occurred.

During the course of a return trip to the

cabin he heard some shots [T.946).

Rick came out of the passageway

near the lower room of the cabin or around the lower end of the
cabin and told Roselund he should Mgo up there", and may have indicated
that someone had been shot (T.946-947).

As he approached the porch

of the cabin he saw Standrod and Earle sitting on the deck (T.947).
He didn't notice anything in either of their hands (T.1036).

He

testified that he looked in the door, came out, and for a reason
he couldn't pinpoint, asked Standrod why "he shot the people" (T.947).
Standrod apparently did not seem aware of what had happened and
kept saying that they were alright, and asked someone to go wake
them up (T.1043-44).

Layton indicated that they stayed on the porch

for 15 to 30 minutes, during which time Rick approached.

He was

not aware of having seen Kunzel on the porch (T.1045).
Candice Earle testified that immediately prior to the
killing she and Standrod were sitting on the porch or the deck
of the cabin in some state of euphoric bliss about the completion
of their cabin and their mutual love for each other (T.1150,1225).
With the esception of Beaty and Morris, she didn't know where the
others at the cabin were (T.1148).

Sometime after getting coffee

for Standrod she walked over to the door of the cabin to ask Tom
and Teresa to come out and discovered they were dead.
\\ras still out on the porch (T.1151).

Standrod

He had come up behind her

and she remembers
him shaking the victim's feet and saying, "Wake
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up", and then addressing a rhetorical question: "Why is that blood
on them;" or "Why is that blood on you?".(T.1153).

Candice then

stated that they went back out on the porch, sat down and then went
back in to double check "because we thought we had imagined the
whole thing" (T.1153),

She then went back out and saw Roselund

walking toward the cabin and told him to come up quick (T.1154).
At that point in her testimony the State brought up a prior statement
made by Candice at preliminary hearing that Kenneth had, during
the period immediately before the killings, gone into the cabin
(T.1157), and that she had said: "Ken, why did you kill those people?"
.(T.1166). However, she further testified that when Layton Roselund
approached he came directly to Standrod and repeatedly said "Why
did you blow those two people away?" (T.1230), and that he [Roselund]
would have to take Standrod "to a fix-it shop and have himself (sic)
fixed,.. ."(T.1171).

Roselund picked up a rifle which Ken had

been cleaning and accosted Ken with it (T.1172).

It was at this

point, after Roselund had accused Standrod of the killings (T.1238),
that Candice made her statement (T.1173).

Layton then commenced

a series of statements related to the fact that Kenneth had been
apparently possessed by some sort of a devil (T.1174) and that it
was GodTs will that "it was done that way",(T.1178).

At this point

Kenneth Standrod denied having killed either of the victims (T.1178).
Throughout this sequence of events Earle did not see either Rick
Higgins or Paul Kunzel enter or leave the cabin (T.1228).

Subsequently

during a conversation in the vicinity of the north porch, Higgins
and Kunzel joined Roselund, Earle and Standrod (T.1181).
whether anyone had seen what happened.

Ken asked

Kunzel just said, "I am

shocked."

Higgins said "I donft know, I was too messed up.

not sure.

I think I saw it.

I saw it and didn't see it."
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I am

The effect of the shots was described by Josiah Taylor,
M.D., then the State Medical Examiner.

Beaty had a wound entering

her right forehead near the eye and exiting the head at the midline
in the rear; and a second wound entering her right deltoid region,
exiting high on the right shoulder, reentering and fracturing the
right jaw, the slug ultimately embedding itself in the seventh
cervical vertibrae.

The slug causing the headwound had no particular

deviation upward or downward, but did deviate sideways at a seventy
degree angle (T.620).

Defects in a parka recovered from the grave

indicated that she was wearing at least the right sleeve of that
parka when she was shot (T.658).

Morris had a wound in the left

chest; the slug penetrated the heart, right lung, and impacted in
the right shoulder from where it was recovered intact.

He had a

second would high in the left arm penetrating soft tissue, and a
third wound in the left arm toward the back which fractured the
bone; fragments of the latter slug were recovered (T.624, £t seq.) .
Taylor indicated that there were at least four but probably five
bullets involved in the deaths.
There is, again, a general consistency regarding material
events occurring subsequent to the time when everyone was reunited
at the conversation which occurred in the vicinity of the north
porch shortly after the shooting.

Layton Roselund decided the bodies

should be buried, and commenced to dig a grave.
carried the bodies to the grave.

Roselund and Higgins

Roselund, on his own initiative,

decided a burial ceremony would be appropriate, sprinkled wheat
and water over the bodies, and recited some sort of prayer (T.1079-80).
Appellant was not significantly involved in preparation of the grave
nor the burial ceremony.
Roselund had insisted that he would not stay on the premDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ises unless the weapons were

?f

gotten rid of"(T.1050), and assumed

an attitude of control of the situation due to his "spiritual awareness" (T. 1051-52) . Standrod "didn't see any reason why the guns
should be gotten rid of"(T.1050); however, Candice Earle was particularly concerned that Roselund remain (T.1052), and Standrod
therefore consented that the guns could be removed from the premises (T.1052).

Roselund suggested that Higgins and Kunzel leave

the cabin (T.1081), and the guns were gathered up (T.1083).

Higgins

and Kunzel left in the U-Haul truck and stopped at Cedar City.
Kunzel headed home to Bremerton, Washington on a motorcycle given
him by Standrod and Higgins continued on to Las Vegas.
There is no doubt that the .357 magnum pistol was in
the U-Haul, because it was impounded by the Las Vegas Police when
Higgins contacted them on the 21st after having discussed the event
with two other persons and dropping off his own weapons.

Kunzel

said that Higgins and Roselund gathered the weapons (T.907); Roselund said he told Higgins to gather the guns, but didn?t see who
did it (T.1083); Higgins said that he, Kunzel and Roselund gathered
the weapons.

However, none of the three recalled having loaded

the ,357 pistol (T.751, 907, 1084), and only Higgins claimed to
have specifically seen it in the truck.

Roselund couldn't recall

it at all (T.1083); Kunzel's testimony was to the effect that he
made a point to be sure all the guns were in the truck, and that
while he couldn't say if he "even did see it," he satisfied his
"curiosity if all the guns were accounted for"(T.906).

No one

claimed that Standrod gathered, nor placed any weapons on the truck.
It is at least interesting to note that the shotgun which Kunzel
used as an excuse for going inside the cabin after hearing shots
had somehov/ gotten back outside right where it was when Kunzel picked
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it up,

Higgins remembered that a .308 and a .30-.30 were being

gathered and the shotgun was on the north porch.

When asked speci-

fically about its position he testified, "Well, I don't remember.
I remember it was back there, against a tree, I believe"(T.750~751) .
Subsequently, Kane County Sheriff's officers and Highway
Patrolmen arrived at the cabin and arrested Standrod, Earle and
Roselund on charges of murder in the first degree.

Subsequently,

Earle and Roselund were granted immunity by the State.
All that is left, then, is to relate the testimony of
Kenneth Standrod, adduced in his own defense.

The defendant's

testimony concerning the events of the evening and morning prior
to the killings is fundamentally consistent with that of all the
other witnesses.

Upon returning to the cabin after the trip to

the spring, Standrod sat down on the deck in front of the cabin
with Candice, and Layton and Lonely Cloud went inside (T.1513).
After some conversation with Candice regarding the cabin being
finished, the final move from Las Vegas, and et. cetera, Candice
went inside to fix some coffee (T.1514).

Standrod went to the

front door, watched her making the coffee, and was aware of a person
inside the cabin to his left.

As Candice was coming toward the

v

front door he stepped inside to let her pass, picked up a 30-30
which was laying by the door, and went back outside and sat down
again (T.1515).

After some brief conversation he heard "hammer

noises" which prompted him to ask Candice where everyone was (T.1517).
Candice said she didn't know, and they both approached the front
door.

Standrod stepped inside the door and saw Tom and Teresa lying

on the foam rubber mattress with blood on them.

He stepped back,

took Candy's hand, went into the cabin, and asked them to wake up
(T.1517-18).

At that time he was not aware of anyone present in
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the cabin (T.1518).

Standrod sat down on the porch and Candice

yelled to Roselund.

Roselund came up on the porch, picked up a

rifle and while shaking it at Standrod asked him why he had killed
"these peoplen(T.1519).

Standrod denied it, and manifested con-

fusion at the question (T.1519).
onto the porch.

At this point, Rick Higgins came

A discussion occurred, during which Roselund "arrested1

Standrod (T.1920),

The conversation drifted through the cabin and

onto the back porch.

Standrod was continually asking the individuals

in the conversation what had happened and what each of them had
seen

(T.1521).

While at the back end of the cabin Roselund demanded

that the guns be removed as a pre-condition for him to remain at
the cabin site (T.1522).

After a conversation between Roselund

and Higgins (T.1525), Roselund walked by with a pick and shovel
and stated, "This is on your shoulders, too, Ken"(T.1526). Roselund
then walked up the hill and apparently, during the next three or
four hours, it was decided by everybody involved that Standrod was
guilty of the offense (T.152S); even Candice Earle (now Standrod)
apparently commenced to take Roselund's side on the matter, (T.1534) •
Roselund, during this entire period of time, more or less took charge
of things, and organized the parties to do tasks which he designated
(T.1537).

Standrod indicated that he was desirous of reporting

the matter to the police, but was advised not to do so by Layton
(T.1538).

He indicated that he made a similar suggestion to Candice

late that evening when they were in bed, but she apparently had
acceded to the advice of Layton and advised him not to do so (T.1543).
Fundamentally Layton told him to forget it (T.1545).

On cross-

examination Standrod indicated that he did not hear gunshots in
the cabin (T.1569), but did hear loud hammering.

He did not see

either Higgins nor Kunzel come out of the south door of the cabin
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(T.1570), and admitted having told Sheriff Deputy Kelley that
was an accident (T.1573),

f,

itM

He clearly denied having killed either

of the victims (T.1576), and continues that denial to this date.
Finally, there is great significance to the uniform
comments of all the witnesses as to the apparent physical and mental
state of Standrod at the time of and immediately after the shooting.
From the mouth of Richard Higgins:
A. I j u s t remember i t was kind of c o n f u s i n g ,
Kenny was s u r e , you know. He - - Kenny d i d n ' t
what had happened, you know, he d i d n ' t - &

that
realize

& &

Well, he just wanted to know what happened, you know,
he just — you know, "Did you see it, did you see
what I did," or he asked me what happened. (T.678).
A. Just that Kenny just -~ everytime he saw somebody, he wanted, you know, their help to know what
had happened and, you know, like he was in a different
state of mind than I had seen him before. (T.682).
A. [Standrod said]: "If I did this thing, kill me."
(T.749).
Q. Did he, at anytime before or thereafter, indicate
to you or anyone else that he had any knowledge of
the actual shooting of those two people?
A. No he didn't. .CT.750).
Higgins replied that he had made the following
statement to Detective Riley Cannon on October 24th.
"Kenny was still, you know, Kenny was still shook
up. He didn't know what he was doing. He really
didnTt know he had done anything." (T.1445).
From the mouth of Paul Kunzel:
A. I walked in and observed Ken standing near the
south door and he looked up at me and we made eye
contact but it was a very strange look that I got
from him. ... I heard Ken say something to the effect
that "So,"what, youfve got a little blood on you."
(T.845).
A. Well, like I say, he was more or less gazing
in the direction of the bodies. He seemed very
distant even from the first glance that I got when
I walked in the north door. (T.848).
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the grave was completed) he had observed: A. "Yes.
He was very, very depressed. He was kneeling on
the ground, cursing the devil, asked me to kill him
with the pick, he was just in a very broken down
state of mind." (T.863)m
A. His attitude was the same, just his broken down
mental state, very broken down, near crying. (T.865).
From the mouth of Layton Roselund:
Right after the shooting: A. I can only remember
[he said] something like,"They are alright," or "They
can get up," or "They will wake up," or something
to that effect, but nothing that to me seemed coherent.
(T.947).
* * *

Well, he looked in kind of a strange state of consciousness. I mean just both of them had kind of
a shocked look and Ken had kind of a docile, starry
kind of look, you know. (T.949).
A. Ken seemed to be kind of indifferent. He was
just not really, like he just wasn't aware of the
situation, you know, and Candy was the one who was
really most concerned and then later -- (T.953).
A. [In relation to the occurrence on the porch]
A, Yes, he seemed to be incoherent to me.
Q. What makes you think he was incoherent? What
happened? What did he say?
A. He seemed to be unaware of -~ he even seemed
to be unaware of what had happened. Just, he made
remarks about something about, "TheyTre alright,
o r "They w i l l get u p . "
(T.1044).
A. [At t h e g r a v e s i t e ] . . . He s a i d a number rofT
t h i n g s : "Did I do t h i s , " or "Why d i d I do it, ' o r ,
"Did I do i t . " . . . I w a s n ' t p a y i n g t h a t much
attention.
I was more in a s t u p o r . . . . ( T . 1 0 5 5 ) .
From t h e mouth of Candice E a r l e :
A. I remember Kenny s h a k i n g h i s foot and s a y i n g ,
"Wake u p , " and then he s a i d , "Why i s t h a t b l o o d
on them," o r , "Why i s t h a t b l o o d on y o u , " and t h e n
we went back out and s a t down and t h e n we went back
i n a g a i n t o double check b e c a u s e we t h o u g h t maybe
we had imagined t h e whole t h i n g ( T . 1 1 5 3 ) .
A.
[Upon b e i n g a c c u s s e d of t h e murders by L a y t o n ,
Ken s a i d ]
I d i d n ' t k i l l anybody.
(T.1178).
A.

[ S t a n d r o d ' s comments d u r i n g t h e b u r i a l ]
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God,

if I did this, please, forgive me. (T.1187). And
to each individual at the grave: "If you saw me
do this, please shoot me.n (T.1245).
A. [At the cabin after the burial, Ken said] What
happened? Can anybody tell me what happened? Did
you see anything? (T.1189).
And from the mouth of Kenneth Standrod:
A. To me, at that moment [the burial] I was naturally
very confused. It was just like a nightmare to me.
These people standing around accusing me and nobody
is telling me anything. And I don't know nothing.
(T.1S27).
A. ... I had started crying then and I had kept
turning to them and asking them, "Well, do you know
that I did this," and at this time Candy and Paul
was there, Rick is there and Layton and I am down
the hill a little way from where they are digging
the grave and so on and I am crying and I have turned
to them again and asked them. At this time things
seem to be a little different though, like everyone
is standing around looking at me like that they're
definately convinced of it at the time.
Q. Convinced of what?
A. That I had shot these people, they had been
discussing it. (T.1528).
A. Well, I was crying and I stood up and looked
at each one of them individually because I was trying
to get a little more control of myself because I
could believe it but then I couldn't believe it,
because no one was giving me an explanation. They
were saying, "Yes," but yet no one knew anything.
A. I turned to each one of them and I asked them,
and I, you know, done this thing and each one gave
the statement before, "Yeah," you know, now they
are giving the statement that I did and then I turned
to them and said, "Well, if I did this thing, why
don't you kill me J1 (T.1259).
The penalty hearing produced no new evidence but only arguments for and against leniency.
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POINT I.

THE CHARGES AS SET FORTH IN INFORMATIONS 10 5 AND 106
TOGETHER WITH THE CONSOLIDATED TRIAL OF SAID CAUSES
SUBJECTED PETITIONER TO BE TWICE PUT IN JEOPARDY FOR
THE SAME OFFENSE.
A.

Petitioner was charged in Information 105 of the

murder in the first degree by the following language:
... On or about the 20th day of October, 1973 at
Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, State of Utah,
the defendant KENNETH LEE STANDROD, did intentionally
and knowingly cause the death of Kenneth Earl Morris
and at the same time and place did commit another
homicide.
In Information 106, petitioner was charged with murder in the first
degree by this language:
... On or about the 20th day of October, 1973 at
Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, State of Utah,
the defendant, KENNETH LEE STANDROD, did intentionally
and knowingly cause the death of Teresa Clair Beatty,
and at the same time and place did commit another
homicide.
The statutory provision alleged to have been violated in the foregoing
matters was Sec. 76-5-202, Utah Code Annot.,1953 as amended, which reads
(1)
Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the
first degree if under circumstances not constituting
manslaughter, the actor intentionally or knowingly
causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
... (b) At the time the homicide was committed
the actor also committed another homicide.
Under the statutory scheme found in Title 76, Chapter 5, Utah Code
Annot.,1953, as amended, the traditional "premeditation" element
of first degree murder has been abandoned in favor of a legislative
finding that "circumstances" rather than "intent" should constitute
the aggrevating factors justifying the punishment attendant to
conviction of murder in the first degree as opposed to murder in
the second degree.

Under Chapter 5 of Title 76, any criminal

homicide not defined as manslaughter, negligent homicide or automobile
homicide is "murder," the only scienter requirement set forth either
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for first degree or second degree murder being "knowing11 or "intentional".
Under both informations the jury was required, in order
to convict petitioner of first degree murder, to find the following:
1.
That petitioner committed criminal homicides
under circumstances not constituting manslaughter;
2.
That the said homicides were knowing or intentional and;
3.
That at the same time the charged homicide
was committed petitioner also committed another homicide.
Only two persons were victims of criminal homicides.

Therefore

it is obvious, inasmuch as the Informations required that the jury
not only find that appellant killed the named victim in each Information but also killed, at the same time, another individual, that
in the Information charging petitioner with the death of Thomas
Earl Morris the "other homicide" victim had to be Teresa Clair Beaty;
and, the "other homicide" in the murder of Beaty must have been Morris.
Inasmuch as the Informations do not charge any circumstance
which would constitute murder in the first degree besides multiple
homicides, it is clear that had appellant been charged with killing
only one victim the maximum offense of which he could have been
convicted is murder in the second degree.

Under the statute, in

order to find petitioner guilty of first degree murder in the death
of Morris, the jury was required, as an element of the offense,
to find that at the same time petitioner also killed Beaty, and
vice versa.

Had the jury not found two separate homicides in each

case, petitioner could not have been found guilty of murder in the
first degree.

Since the second homicide in each case is an element

of the offense for which additional penalty is exacted, petitioner
was clearly placed "twice in jeopardy" for each of the homicides.
B.

The language of the double jeopardy clause in the Con-
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stitution of Utah (Article I, Sec.12) is identical to that contained
in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
There is therefore no distinction between the meaning of the state
double jeopardy provision and that contained in the federal Constitution.

In any event the federal jeopardy provision is applicable

against the states by reason of the Fourteen Amendment.
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 23 L.Ed.2d 707, 89 S.Ct. 2056.

Benton
Therefore

the federal standard is applicable to determination of whether
appellant has been denied his right to be free from double jeopardy.
C.

There is a significant body of case law defining

the scope and meaning of the double jeopardy clause related to
meaning of the word "offense11 as it is used therein.
The controlling double jeopardy case as of this date is
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L.Ed.2d 469, 90 S.Ct.1189 (1970)
in which the defendant, with others, was charged with armed robbery
of a poker game in which there were six players.

The defendants

were charged with seven separate offenses which included counts of
robbing each of the six victims.
were called to testify.

At trial, four of the victims

Testimony indentifying defendant as one

of the robbers was weak, and the jury found him Mnot guilty due
to insufficient evidence".

Later the defendant was tried for the

robbery of one of the other victims and was convicted upon substantially stronger testimony from essentially the same witnesses on
the question of his identity.

In sustaining defendant's conviction

in habeas corpus proceedings the District Court felt itself bound
by the decision in Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, which involved
a multiple robbery in a tavern and in which the Supreme Court upheld
petitioner's conviction, viewing the question presented solely on
due process grounds and concluding that the course the state had
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pursued had not led to "fundamental unfairness."
In Ashe, the Supreme Court held that Benton v. Maryland,
supra, required the Court to ansv/er not the question whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but whether it is
an essential part of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against double
jeopardy.

The Court did "not hesitate" to hold that it is; supra,

at 397 U.S. 445, and that the question of its applicability in a
particular case was no longer a matter to be left for state determination but a matter of constitutional fact to be decided upon
the entire record.

Concluding that since the first jury could not,

on the record, have concluded that there was no robbery, the ^ourt
stated that
[ojnce a jury had determined upon conflicting evidence
that there was at least a reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was one of the robbers, the state could
not present the same or different identification
evidence in a second prosecution for the robbery. ..;
supra at 446.
The Court apparently found that the term "robbery" as defined
by the code of the charging state, was a synonym for the term "offense" as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment, and held that
once having been acquitted of the acts constituting that offense,
appellant could not be retried for them.

Justices Brennen, Douglas

and Marshall, concurring, adopted the "same transaction" test for
double jeopardy purposes, indicating that defendant could only
be tried once for events occurring during the'same criminal transaction.

Justice Brennan specifically adopted the view that one

can be tried only once for all criminal offenses embodied in a
single criminal episode.

This view is the rule in Utah under Sec.

76-1-403, Utah Code (1975 Pocket Supp.).
Ashe, supra,

overruled a significant body of case
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387, and People v. Logomarsino, 217 P.2d 124, 97 C.A.2d 92.

The

Ashe rule has been adopted by the courts of most of the western
states.

State v. Quintana, 364 P.2d 120, 69 N.M. 51 is typical:
If several criminal offenses are the same, as where
they arise out of the same transaction, were committed
at the same time, and were part of a continuous act
and inspired by the same criminal intent, which is
an essential element of each offense, they are susceptible of only one punishment.

See also, Application of Williams, 333 P.2d 280, 85 Ariz. 109, and
People v. Brown, 320 P.2d 5, 49 C.2d 577, In the latter case defendant
tfas charged with and convicted of both murder and abortion, and
the California Supreme Court struck the conviction for abortion
on the theory that the criminal intent requisite for both offenses
was merged into one cause of action which barred trial for both
offenses.

Other cases embodying the general reasoning of this

holding are People v. Belcher, 15 Cr.L. 264 (Cal.S.Ct. 3/28/74),
State v. Gregory, 16 Cr.L. 2539 (N.J.S.Ct. 2/26/75), State v.
Maestes, N.M.S.Ct. (9/18/74).
There is significant authority for the proposition that
where a defendant is charged with one crime on two theories and
a general verdict is returned finding defendant either guilty or
not guilty without a statement as to which theory the jury considered
in arriving at its verdict, retrial under either theory is barred
by the double jeopardy clause.
90 L.Ed.

562, 68 S.Ct. 397.

See Musser v. Utah, 330 U.S. 95,
See also, Yeates v. U.S., 354 U.S.

298, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356, 77 S.Ct. 1064; Street v. New York, 395 U.S.
516, 22 L.Ed.2d 572, 89 S.Ct.. 13; Leary v. U.S. , 395 U.S. 6, 23
L.Ed.2d 57, 89 S.Ct. 1532.

Thus, logically, if there is ambiguity

as to which of the theories formed the basis for the verdict on
the first trial,
retrial must be barred because of the possibility
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be duplicated in the second in violation of double jeopardy prohibitions.
In the instant case it is clear that the killing of Beaty
was found by the jury as an element of the first degree charge of
killing Morris, and vice versa.

Musser, supra, and the other cases

cited, are therefore authority for the proposition that once a
verdict has been rendered on a charge in which the second homicide
was found as an element, no further proceeding can be had charging
a criminal offense based on that same act.
The Utah rule on double jeopardy has not been subject to
construction dispositive of the issue raised herein.

The courtfs

language in State v. Thatcher, 157 P.2d 258 108 Utah 63, however, indicates that the Utah Court is of the same view as most of the courts
cited above.
Under the doctrine of former jeopardy, if the two
actions were for the same offense, the former was
a complete bar to the latter. But if they were
not for the same offense, the former was no bar
to any element of the latter, even though such
element was common to both actions.
... , where the prosecution is barred under the
doctrine of former jeopardy, the entire action is
barred and not merely the use of certain elements
thereof.
In this case, the statutory scheme under which appellant was
tried permits the charging of murder in the second degree for a
knowing or intentional killing, and that offense becomes murder
in the first degree only where a multiple homicide is proved. Appellant has been placed in jeopardy for two killings on a single charge
of murder in the first degree, because the second killing is a necessary element of murder in the first degree.

In this case, appel-

lant was charged with the murder of Thomas Earl Morris.

That act

would support a conviction for first degree murder only if the jury
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the murder of Beaty, that killing would not be murder in the first
degree, but murder in the second degree, unless the jury also found
that at the same time appellant killed Morris.

Conviction of first

degree murder carries a substantially greater penalty than second
degree murder.

Therefore, under the cases heretofore cited, the

most the state could charge was either one first degree murder which
would require a finding of both killings, or in the alternative,
two charges of second degree murder or manslaughter.
An elementary analysis perhaps serves a purpose.

If

it takes two killings to constitute one murder in the first degree
under the section charged, then it must obviously take four to
constitute two murders in the first degree.

In this case we have

only two homicides; therefore, one first degree murder is all appellant can be convicted of without placing him twice in jeopardy for
each of the killings.
There are several reasons why appellant has been materially
prejudiced by this constitutional violation.
First, mere characterization of the second homicide as
another nfirst degree murder" has an inherent capacity to prejudice.
Once the knowing and intentional killing of the victim named in
the first first degree homicide charge is proved, all the state
must do to secure a conviction for first degree murder is prove
another

ff

homicide.M

Since that homicide is not, under the statute,

required to be any particular one of the five different kinds of
criminal homicide proscribed by Chapter 5 of title 76, prejudicial
characterization of the offense should be barred, it being irrelevant
to any legitimate issue in the case.

Further, there is authority

for the proposition that that the state would not be permitted to
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would be prejudicial to defendant.

See U.S. v. Ostrowsky, 501

F.2d 318 (7th Cir.1974) in which the government v/as allowed to introduce evidence that the owner of a vehicle had been murdered to prove,
in defendant's Dyer Act trial, that he knew the car was stolen.
In reversing the Court said:
•..the court abused its discretion in permitting
proof of the gruesome and unnecessary details of
Croach's murder. By presenting all the gruesome
evidence ... the judge allowed the government to
submit evidence to the jury that was at best cumulative. ... moreover, the probable effect of the ruling
was to divert.the attention of the jury to the murder
and away [from the crime charged].
The second reason applies here.

The manner of charging

permitted introduction of twice as many pictures of dead and maimed
bodies; twice as many bloody clothes, and all the gruesome details
of the death of a young couple and the evidence of their relationship
which would not have been admissible in a single trial.

Further,

had the state been forced to elect which case to proceed with and
gone on Morris, the jury would have been spared the highly prejudicial evidence of the gruesome death of a young woman.

Not knowing

what the state would have done, the prejudice must be presumed.
Second,

the facts in this case raise another probability

of prejudice, to-wit:

that defendant was deprived of one or more

affirmative defenses by the manner of charging and joint trial of
the indictments.

There is substantial evidence on the record that

Morris and Beaty were killed with a .357 magnum pistol.

There is

substantial evidence that the last person seen in possession of
that weapon was the victim Morris.

This fact does raise a possibility

of a defense of self-defense or justifiable homicide.

However,

when the death of Beaty was charged as an independant first degree
homicide, the use of that defense is effectively barred because
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the first degree murder charge of Beaty.

If, on the other hand,

the state had elected to proceed only with the trial of first degree
murder in the case of Morris, with Beaty being the second homicide
undesignated as to degree, the possibility of a self-defense would
be substantially greater because it would go to the only charged
homicide.

As to this issue the case of Wikberg v. Henderson, 15

C.L.2101 (Louisiana S.Ct. 3/25/74) is in point.

In that case de-

fendant v/as tried and convicted for felony murder which occurred
during the course of a robbery.
for the robbery itself.

Subsequently, defendant was tried

The court held:

... to convict the defendants for attempted robbery
following their conviction for felony murder arising
out of the same incident violates the prohibition
against double jeopardy. This holding is required
because of the nature of the felony murder doctrine.
... The state is relieved of proving intent to kill
or inflict great bodily harm. This, in effect, deprived the defendant of several defenses which would
be available in a prosecution for intentional murder.
For example, a plea of accident, mistake and probably
even self-defense is unavailing under the felony
murder doctrine. The only requirements for conviction
are the commission or attempted commission of the
enumerated felony and a resulting death ...
The facts are essentially similar here.

As with the Louisiana felony

murder theory, the Utah multiple homicide provision relieved the
state from proving any intent beyond that required for second degree
murder.

Once two murders are established, the defendant is presumed

to be guilty of first degree murder in the absence of affirmative
evidence that he was not guilty of manslaughter.

In this case

there was a very substantial possibility of a defense of justifiable
homicide or self defense as to the murder of Thomas Earl Morris,
which defense was groundless in the case of Beaty.

Charging both

first degree murders with the second homicide being an additional
necessary element of each, and then trying them together, thereby
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

deprived appellant of the
possible
use
of
this defense.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
contain
errors.

Thus, he

has been prejudiced under the holding of Wikberg, supra.
Third, the Supreme Court has spoken on a similar issue.
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L.Ed.2d 300, 90 S.Ct. 1757 (1970)
was a case in which the defendant was charged with murder and found
guilty of voluntary manslaughter.

Defendant was sentenced to prison

for a period of ten to fifteen years, but his conviction was subsequently reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court.

He was then retried

for murder and again convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced
to ten years imprisonment.

The defendant argued that the second

trial placed him twice in jeopardy, inasmuch as he had been impliedly
acquitted of first degree murder in the first trial.

Despite the

holding of Green v. U.S., 355 U.S. 184, the Georgia Supreme Court
rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction. Chief Justice
Burger, in reversing the conviction,stated at 398 U.S. 326:
n

The prohibition [against double jeopardy] is not
against being twice punished, but against being twice
put in jeopardy ... ." The "twice put in jeopardy"
language of the Constitution thus relates to a potentional, i.e. , the risk that an accused for a second
time will be convicted of the same offense for which
he was initially tried.
Green v. U.S., supra, held that a second trial for first
degree murder after a conviction for a lesser and included offense
was barred because jeopardy for murder ended when a jury could have
found defendant guilty of the higher charge but didn't, thus, impliedly
acquitting him of it. After reaffirming Green, the Court, at 398
U.S. 331, rejected Georgia's contention that the error was harmless
(because at the second trial defendant received no greater punishment) .
The Double Jeopardy Clause, as we have noted, is cast
in terms of the risk or hazard of trial and conviction^
not of the ultimate legal consequences of the verdict.
To be charged and to be subjected to a second trial
for first-degree murder is an ordeal not to be viewed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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iigntly. Further, and perhaps of more importance,
we cannot determine whether or not the murder charge
against petitioner induced The jury^TcTTInd him~^TTiTty
of the less serious offense of voluntary manslaughter
rather than to continue to debate his" innocenceT
~
1 Emphasis added].

M

significant, particularly when the trial occurs in a small county

I
I

wherein knowledge of the facts is widespread.

I

This is the very evil which obtains in the present case.

The

contumely flowing from the very charge of first degree murder is

state was permitted to charge a second

The fact that the

!,

first degree murder" involving

the same individual whose death was required, under the statute,

1

to permit a duplicity which cannot help but have been prejudicial

I

to defendant.

I

to be found as an element of another first degree murder charge is

Under the theory of the Price, supra, case this

factor alone requires post-trial relief setting aside the conviction. ^

I
Finally, petitioner recommends to the Court the language
of Mr. Justice Marshall, then sitting as a Circuit Court Judge,

•
•

in U.S.ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkens, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.1965),
cert,denied, 383 U.S. 913.

In that case defendant had been charged

|

with first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.
His conviction was reversed.

He was then retried for murder in

the first degree and convicted of murder in the first degree and
sentenced to death.
versed.

J
|

Subsequently, his conviction was again re-

He was then tried for a third time for murder in the first

degree and again convicted of murder in the second degree.

I

Several

years later defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus on the ground

1

that retrial for murder in the first degree violated the double

|

jeopardy clause even though he had not raised that proposition
at trial.

The Second Circuit, per Judge Marshall, in an exhaustive

analysis, concluded
that
theLawDue
Clause
does have double
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jeopardy content, that under at lease one of several constitutional

|

I

theories, retrial for first degree murder after a verdict of murder in the second degree was constitutionally infirm, and that the
insecurity and anxiety, the opportunity of harrassment, and the
marginal increase in the probability of convicting the accused of
a crime he did not commit by simply trying him again, all formed
the basis of the CourtTs fear and abhorrance of reprosecutions.
Then, in summary, the Court held at. 867:
We therefore hold: I. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes some limitations
on a state's power to reprosecute an individual for
the same crime. II. New York transgressed these
limitations by reprosecuting Hetenyi for first degree
murder following the completion of the first trial,
notwithstanding Hetenyi's successful appeal of the
second first degree murder conviction obtained in
that trial. III. There is a reasonable possibility
that Hetenyi was prejudiced in his third trial by
the fact that he was indicted, prosecuted and charged
with "first" degree murder; and both this possibility
of prejudice and the fact that it was created by
conduct that violated the accused's constitutional
rights rendered this trial constitutionally inadequate. Hetenyi has been deprived of his liberty
without due process of law, and therefore he is being
held in custody in violation of the Constitution.
[Emphasis added].
In this case, petitioner was twice tried for murder in
the first degree in a manner violative of his constitional rights.
Apart from the obvious fact that he is presently being punished
twice for the same act, there is more than a "possibility" that
his conviction for one first degree murder resulted from the fact
that he was charged with a second.

Therefore, under the authorities

cited, he is entitled to a new trial on a proper charge.
POINT II. SECTION 76-5-202 AND SECTION 76-3-207, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(19 73 POCKET SUPPLEMENT) UNDERWHICH APPELLANT WAS TRIED
AND CONVICTED ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
In Furman v, Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92
S.Ct.2726, a five member plurality of the United States Supreme
Court ruled:
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The court holds that the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
"These cases11 referred to two from Georgia and one from Texas in
which the rape and murder penalty statutes involved provided that '.
the jury or court had unfettered discretion to impose either death
or life imprisonment.

Both provisions were substantially identical

to Sec.76-30-4, Utah Code Annot, (1953) , as amended, which provision
has since been repealed. This Court twice dealt with the impact
of Furman on that section in State v. Winkle, 528 P.2d 467,
Ut

-2d _ _ _

(1974)and 535 P.2d 82, _ _ _ _ _ U.2d _____ (1975).

In Winkle the trial judge had ruled that the Utah alternative
penalty provision was severable, that Furman outlawed the second
alternative, and that thus the death penalty was mandatory upon
conviction of first degree murder.

This Court reversed and remanded

for a new trial at which the jury was to be given the prerogative
of determining penalty pursuant to the statute despite the contrary
mandate of Furman.

Justice Henriod filed a strong dissenting

opinion which, with all deference, was far more consistent with
the rule of Furman.

He concluded that the trial court had extra-

polated the correct application of Furman to our statute, particularly in light of the reasoning of State v. Dickerson, 298 A. 2d
761 (Del.1972) and State v. Waddel, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S.E.2d 19
(1973).

An examination of the majority Winkle opinion suggests

three possible explanations for its adoption of a logically weaker
view.

First, the opinion expressed the conclusion that the Legis-

lature, in enacting prior Sec.76-30-4, had made it clear that
the death penalty was riot to be mandatory in all cases of first degree
murder with the result that the section had to be upheld or unvaliDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dated as a whole.

Thus, if it were declared unconstitutional,the stat

would be left with no penalty for first degree murder.

Second,

the opinion expressed obvious pique that the Supreme Court "...G^ith
its nine separate opinions) has created the confusion; now let
it lead this state and others out of this morass."

The third

explanation lies in the opinion's intimation that the Utah Legislature (which was to meet in special session in early 1975) would
cure the problem by legislative action.

Regardless of the Court's

motive in holding as it did, Winkle ignores the fact that there
is really no legitimate "confusion" about FurmanTs effect on our
statute, and what this Court did was simply refuse to give effect
to clear directions from the Supreme Court of the United States.
As this Court anticipated the 1973 Legislature repealed Sec.
76-30-4 and enacted Sec.76-5-202 and 76-3-207, apparently for
the specific purpose of reinstating the death penalty in Utah.
Several states had, after Furman, enacted death penalty provisions
thought to be consistent with it because they made the death penalty
mandatory in specific instances.
pattern.

Sec.76-5-202 is of the same

Apparently not satisfied with what by itself is probably

a constitutional death penalty provision, the Legislature (or more
properly the drafters of those provisions) promptly enacted Sec.
76-3-207, which renders the new statute unconstitutional in precisely the same manner as prior Sec. 76-30-4 is unconstitutional:
the jury or court still has unfettered discretion.

It is understand-

able that this Court, on the date of the first Winkle opinion,
likely thought that the drafters of our criminal code and the Legislature would come to their senses before the 1975 special session
and remedy the new defect.

The fact of the matter is that they

did not and our code is still patently unconstitutional.

All else

having failed,
the constitutional onus still fell on this Court.
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The opportunity to resolve the problem came promptly
in

State v. Winkle

(on rehearing), 535 P. 2d 82,

U.2d _ _ _ _ _

(1975), decided after the 1975 Legislature had failed to enact
a legislative solution.

The Court's reponse to the opportunity

is disappointing, for instead of deciding the issue it accepted
a rather dubious cop-out proffered by the state, i.e., a consession
that had the jury been given the discretion demanded by the statute
it would have recommended leniency, and remanded for sentencing
to life imprisonment.

Again, Chief Justice Henriod filed a strong

dissent accusing the majority of trying to cure the problem with
a pair of nonsequiturs.

Thus this Court has twice evaded its

responsibility to insure constitutional trials of criminal cases
in Utah*
Two problems result.

First, capital homicide trials

in Utah are essentially for naught.
unconstitutional.

Under Furman our statute is

If this Court chooses to follow the mandate

of the Supreme Court it must therefore reverse appellant's conviction.

If it chooses to continue to ignore the mandate, then

in that event all cases tried under our first degree murder statute
will likely result in issuance of federal writs of habeas corpus*
Second, and more important, the contention that the
resolution fashioned in Winkle II "removes the only matter of
error which could be prejudicial to [defendant]" is simply false.
There is an inherent and substantial prejudice to defendants tried
under Sections 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 which would be sufficient
by itself to raise a serious question of due process, but which
is even more onerous because those provisions are otherwise unconstitutional .
At Digitized
the byoutset
this
case
the
after being informed
the Howard W.of
Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark jury,
Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of its duty to render a verdict as to guilt or innocence, was
told, (at T.301):
So that you will understand at this time after the
fact has been determined, which is basically guilty
or innocence, or something, the court -- this is
what they call a bifurcated trial, if the verdict
should be guilty Murder in the First Degree, there
is a potentional and possible and maybe I should
change it. There is a possible of capital punishment
or the death penalty. At that time if that is the
verdict, there will be another trial and at that
time, we will then go through these procedures before
you or before me and there are alternatives here
that must be determined before we get to that point
and at that time there could be other evidence and
other facts brought to your attention which would
go to the elements of punishment that might not
be involved in the first trial.
This addled proposition was more clearly set forth in the Courtfs
formal instructions after the evidence was in.

The jury was aware

of the probability that it would have a role in fashioning the
punishment to which appellant would be subjected if he were convicted.
All trial lawyers recognize the danger of compromised
verdicts in jury trials; i.e. situations where one or two jurors
who are holding out for acquittal can be persuaded by the other
jurors to render a guilty verdict to a lesser and included offense.
Sec.76-30-3 raised the similar possiblity of a compromise recommendation of leniency with jurors who were holding out for conviction of second degree or manslaughter rather than first degree,
murder.

For a variety of reasons no issue has ever been made

of this situation.

The time has come

to do so.

In this case there was significant evidence to warrant
conviction of a lesser offense than first degree murder.

Jurors

inclined toward that view may well have been induced to surrender
it by an agreement of the other jurors to recommend leniency at
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This is especially true where, as in this case, juries are told
that there will probably be other evidence involved in the penalty
hearing going to the "elements of punishment" which is not before
it in the initial trial.

These jurors were never clearly told

that the discretion to impose something less than the death penalty
might not be theirs at all, but might be rested upon the court
in its sole discretion.

Even though the court imposed life imprison-

ment, a statutory scheme which makes available to the jury, if
not encourages, compromise, works to the unfair detriment of criminal defendants, particularly when the very structural statutory
scheme which creates the danger is unconstitutional.

It thus denied

due process and warrants a new trial for second degree murder due
to the complete invalidity of our first degree murder provisions.
This Court should cease to evade its constitutional
responsibilities and desist from waiting for the federal courts
to set right what are purely state affairs.

It should rule that

Sections 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 are both unconstitutional.

At the

very least it should invalidate the latter of the two which is
so obviously defective under Furman.

The failure of this Court

to do so will accomplish nothing more than encourage meddling by
federal courts in what are essentially state affairs.

Regressive

and evasive holdings by state high courts have, and will continue
to invite and abet the already dangerous centralization of judicial
power in this country to the grave detriment of its citizens.
If the remaining vestige of judicial federalism envisioned by the
founding fathers is to survive, it will do so only if state courts
of nlast resort" give firm and unswerving effect to controlling
mandates of the United States Supreme Court, and forge progressive
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muster.

This case presents the third chance this Court has had

to do so in the context of death penalty cases.

It must not sur-

render the opportunity.
POINT III.THE COURT ERRED IN ITS RULINGS CONCERNING THE ISSUE OF
THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
Sec.76-2-305, Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides:
MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT. (1) In any prosecution
for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant, at the time of the proscribed conduct, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law. (Emphasis added).
(2) As used in this section, the terms "mental
disease" or "defect" do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
antisocial conduct.
Sec.76-2-306, Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides:
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION. Voluntary intoxication shall
not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state
which is an element of the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element
of the offense and the actor is unaware of the risk
because of involuntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense.
Thus, if one demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court or
jury that he falls within the provisions of Sec. 76-2-30 5 he cannot, by reason of his incapacity to commit crime (see now repealed
Sec. 76-1-41), be found guilty of or punished for an offense.
However, if one establishes, upon being charged with a criminal
offense of which a given mental state is an element, that by reason
of voluntary intoxication he did not have the capacity to act
with that mental state, he cannot be found guilty of that offense,
though he might be found guilty of a lesser and included offense
requiring only recklessness or criminal negligence as an element.
Sec.76-2-308 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) provides
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that both insanity and voluntary intoxication are affirmative defenses, thus necessitating that they be raised by the defense.
See, however, argument at Point IV, infra, p.48.

Appellant filed

a Notice of Intent to Rely on the Defense of Insanity (R.5),

a

Complaint for Determination of Sanity (R.12) and a Motion for
Commitment to the Utah State Hospital for observation and treatment
(R.lOb).
from

However, no evidence was adduced that he was suffering

ff

mental disease or defect,11 though there was evidence that

y

he was under the influence of drugs (T.H.C.) when the killings
occurred;

Statement of Facts, supra, p.3 and pp.13-15.

The

evidence raised a substantial question of whether defendant, if
he killed the victims, could have done so "knowingly or intentionally11
At the close of the defense case in chief, a colloquy
occurred in chambers concerning the state's intention to call a
psychiatrist whom the state indicated would testify that the defendant was "sane."

Defense counsel indicated that the defendant

had "emphatically withdrawn the insanity question," and to remove
all doubt, formally removed insanity as & defense.

(T.1589).

After satisfying itself that the withdrawal was voluntary, the
Court stated:
The Court finds and is of the opinion that there
is evidence before the Court both as to the use
of drugs by all of the parties present and that
there is testimony by at least of two witnesses
any maybe more to the effect that the defendant
did not appear to be — was of normal mind at the
time of the alleged shooting. The Court finds that
there is sufficient ground to have the insanity
question go before the jury, the question of insanity.
So the Court so rules at this time, so you can proceed. [Emphasis added].
*

*

*

THE COURT: Very well. The point is that it appears
to the Court that there is a duty to determine whether
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of facts and the Court feels that there is sufficient
evidence that this is a question of fact that the
Jury 's'Hould decide. [Emphasis added].
In a last-ditch effort to avoid the disaster which actually occurred
in the case, defense counsel made a motion "that the Court direct
the jury and direct the verdict that the defendant be found not
guilty of insanity (sic)," which the Court denied; (T.1591); apparently relying on the ancient rule of State v. Holt, 449 P.2d 119,
22 U.2d 109:
The presumption of sanity prevails only until such
time as evidence is received at trial which tends
to show insanity. It is then the duty of the trial
judge to determine whether as a matter of law there
is sufficient evidence to remove the presumption.
[Emphasis added].
The CourtTs error apparently arose out of its (and counsels1)
failure to properly distinguish "insanity" from "diminished capacity."

As a result the insanity question, which was not relevant,

was presented to the jury, and it was given only a muddled and
incomplete instruction on an issue which was more than fairly raised
by the evidence, i.e., "diminished capacity" by reason of voluntary
intoxication.

The following are specific errors caused by this

general problem.
A.
COUNSEL.

DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF

Submission of the issue of insanity to the jury and the

introduction of testimony about it constituted a violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

Without justification

on the evidence, the Court's ruling had the effect of obliterating
and completely overriding a tactical decision made by defense counsel (in which the defendant participated after obvious consultation
with counsel) as to the most effective manner in which to proceed.
See, Herring v. New York,

'

U.S.

'

, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95 S.Ct.
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(June 30, 1975) regarding the role of trial counsel in state

prosecutions.

At 45 L.Ed.2d 598, the United States Supreme Court

The decisions of this Court have not given to these
constitutional provisions a narrowly literalistic
construction [provisions related to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel ' ] . More specifically, the
right to the assistance of counsel has been understood
to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the
function of counsel in defending a criminal" prosecution in accord with the traditions of the adversary
factfinding process that has been constitutionalized
in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
*

*

*

The right to the assistance of counsel has thus
been given a meaning that ensures to the defense
in a criminal trial the opportunity to participate
fully and fairly in the adversary factfinding process.
The Court has made it abundantly clear that the role of counsel
includes the right to make all tactical decisions related to trial
of the case except those limited by constitutional considerations.
In Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 32 L.Ed.2d 358,923.Ct. 1891
(19 72) a majority of the Supreme Court made the following comments,
at U.S. 364, in invalidating a Tennessee statute providing that
if the defendant elected to take the stand, he must do so prior
to the introduction of any other defense testimony:
Whether the defendant is to testify is an important
tactical decision as well as a matter of constitutional right. By requiring the accused and his lawyer
to make that choice without an opportunity to evaluate
the actual worth of their evidence, the state restricts
the defense—particularly counsel-^in the planning of
its case. Furthermore, the penalty for not testifying
first is to keep the defendant off*the stand entirely,
even though as a matter of professional judgment
his lawyer might want to call him later in the trial.
The accused is thereby deprived of the nguiding hand
of counsel" in the timing of this critical element
of his defense. While nothing we say here otherwise
curtails in any way the ordinary power of a trial
judge to set the order of proof, the accused and his
counsel may not be restricted in deciding whether,
and when in the course of presenting his defense,
the accused should take the stand.
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case is no less significant

and critical to the defense, particularly where he had not placed
his client's sanity in issue.

The trial judge's substitution of

his own judgment, obviously based on a misunderstanding of the
law, for the judgment of trial counsel, constitutes an impermissible
invasion of appellant's right to the "guiding hand of counsel.11".
The prejudice of this impermissible deprivation was made immediately
and abundantly clear by the testimony elicited by the state from
>

it's psychiatrist.
B.-

TESTIMONY ADDUCED REGARDING "SANITY11 WAS IMPROPER

AND PREJUDICIAL.

The second specific error created by the court's

erroneous ruling concerning the issue of insanity is that it allowed
the testimony of Glen Erick Johnson, M.D., then a resident in psychiatry at the State of Utah Medical Center in Salt Lake City, to be
presented to the jury.

At T.1595:

A.
We proceeded to do a full investigation in the
matter of Mr. Standrod's sanity and I engaged in sn
extensive series of interviews, psychological testings,
and observation of Mr. Standrod over a period of thirty
days in our forensic psychiatry ward.
Q.
Was this done to derive at a diagnosis?
A.
Yes sir it was.
Q.
Did you derive at a diagnosis?
A.
Yes, sir. We did.
Q.
Now what was your diagnosis?
A.
My diagnosis was that of a personality disorder
of anti-social type.
0.
What does that mean?
A.
Essentially it means a characteristic lifestyle
evidenced by difficulty in personal relationships
with people, but primarily difficulty with the law,
illegal activities and manipulation of people with
regard to the law.
Defense counsel forthwith objected and moved for a mistrial on
the basis that this line of questioning was totally improper,
characterizing it as an attempt to bring in hearsay evidence of
prior bad acts and improper evidence of character. Counsel rightly
stated that the character of the defendant had not been placed
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was totally impermissible.(T.1594-1597), The assistant attorney
general responded as follows at T.1602:
However, I think the character disorder described
is typical of people who have engaged in criminal
activities, 1 also think that what I intend to
go into here is asking the doctor to describe what
he found from the interview and examination of the
defendant that he thought were from a psychiatric
point of view significant and state those to the
jury, so that they have some basis to determine
how they arrived at the conclusion they reached.
It would appear from this statement that defense counsel was correct
in his assessment of the State's tactics.

Aside from the fact

that the testimony was irrelevant to any issue legitimately raised
on the evidence, Mr. McCarthy's view of the permissible scope of
examination concerning a psychiatric conclusion is clearly erroneous ,
Under the statutes of the State of Utah, the sanity of
a defendant is relevant at only three points of time — the time
of the alleged offense; the time of trial and the time of imposition
of punishment.

The only point of time to which the appellant's

sanity was relevant is October 20, 1973; see Sec.76-2-306, 77-48-1,
and People v. Calton, 5 U. 451, 460, 16 P.902. With this in mind,
it is clear that the series of questions and answers put to the
psychiatrist was improper even if sanity had been in issue, because
they do not limit the doctor's opinion to the period of time during
which the alleged offense occurred.

The questions are clearly

an invitation for Dr. Johnson to state a diagnosis of Mr. Standrod's
character, as opposed to a legitimate inquiry into his sanity on
October 20th.

If Section 76-2-306 means anything near what it

says, the only permissible and relevant question would have been:
Doctor, in light of your examination of the defendant
and the tests you performed on him and the interviews
you
engaged in with him, do you have an opinion
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as to whether on October 20th, 1973, defendant lacked
substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct
to the requirements of law by reason.of mental disease
or defect?
An affirmative answer would have led to the obvious question: What
is your opinion.

Further questions would be limited to the founda-

tion of his opinion, and nothing further about a particular medical
diagnosis would be relevant.
It was clear that the doctor was not of the opinion that
the defendant was insane.

At T.1595, his diagnosis is limited

to that of personality disorder of the anti-social type" which
would obviously not fit within the terms of mental defect or disease
as used in 76-2-305, especially since, contrary to the statute,
it appears to have been based in some measure on prior criminal
conduct.

The next question "What does that mean" was nothing more

than an invitation to character assassination, and was not reasonably calculated to adduce meaningful or admissible evidence.

This

testimony is atrocious in its prejudice to appellant who had admitted
that he was sane.
Though this precise issue has never been directly broached
by the Supreme Court of Utah, it has been often raised in federal
prosecutions by a statutory provision that the United States attorney is entitled to require a defendant to submit to psychiatric
evaluation prior to trial.

Defendants have long asserted that

United States attorneys were merely using this proceedure as

a

ruse to conduct detailed interrogations of criminal defendants,
in the absence of counsel, out of the mouths of psychiatrists.
In response to such allegations the Seventh Circuit in U.S. v.
Bohle, 445 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1971) stated at 66:
Such an examination [without the presence of counsel]
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because its sole purpose to enable an expert to
form an opinion as to the defendant's mental capacity
to form a criminal intent. It is not intended to
aid in the establishment of facts showing that
defendant committed certain acts constituting a
crime. In cannot be so used, for it is impermissible
to introduce into evidence on the issue of guilt
any statement made by the defendant during the course
of such examination.
See also, U.S. v. Albright, 388 F. 2d 719 (4th Cir.1968).
The testimony of Dr. Johnson in this case clearly violates this
rule of due process, because he could not have known of appellant's
"difficulty with the law, illegal activities and manipulations of
people" had appellant not related them to him.

Furthermore, the

State's attorney had already agreed that the record of appellant's
prior convictions (which were very limited) would not, under the
Utah Rules

of Evidence, be admissible (T.1602).

What he fashioned

out of the mouth of the psychiatrist was a method of getting that
evidence before the jury in a manner which he calculated would not
violate the Utah Rules of Evidence, i.e., Rule 21 which provides:
Evidence of a conviction of a witness for a crime
not involving dishonesty or false statement shall
be inadmissible for the purpose of impairing his
credibility, except as otherwise provided by statute,
and Rules 46 and 47, relating d to "character evidence" which provides
When a person's character or a trait of his character
^ s in issue, it may be proved by testimony in the
form of opinion evidence of reputation, or evidence
of specific instances of the person's conduct, subject, however to the limitations of Rule 47 and 48
[Rule 47 stating "in a criminal action evidence of
a trait of an accused's character as tending to prove
his guilt or innocence of the offense charged, if
offered by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may
be admitted only after the accused has entered
evidence of his good character.] [Emphasis added].
It is clear that appellant had not put his character
into question.

Thus, the State's eliciting the subject testimony

from Dr. Johnson was merely a shabby method of evading the stricture
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of these rules and could not have helped but contribute to a juryfs
finding of his guilt in light of the evidence in this case concerning appellantfs purportedly "bizarre" lifestyle.
This entire situation created error which violated defendant's right to due process as secured to him by the Fourteenth

,•

Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article
I Section 7

of Constitution of Utah.

POINT IV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY ERRONEOUS
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
The jury in this case was instructed that it could find
defendant guilty either of first or second degree murder or manslaughter.

Manslaughter was defined in accordance with Sec.76-5-205

which provides:
MANSLAUGHTER. - (1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another;
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance
for which there is a reasonable explanation
or excuse;
(c) Causes the death of another under circumstances
where the actor reasonably believes the circumstances provide a moral or legal justification
or extenuation for his conduct although the
conduct is not legally justifiable or excusable
under the existing circumstances.
The court instructed that first degree murder requires "knowing"
or "intentional" killings and that second degree murder requires
one of the following mental elements:

"Intentional or knowing"

killing, "Inten[t] to cause serious bodily injury," or "reckless
[conduct] which creates a grave risk of death under circumstances
evidenc(ing) depraved indifference to human life."

Thus, each

verdict requires some finding related to the defendants state
of mind.
Two sections of our criminal code, both discussed supra,
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provide relief to defendants who commit criminal acts while they
are in some degree non compos mentis.

The first relates to "mental

illness or defect," and the second relates to "intoxication."
Instruction No, 22-A (T.1665) is a partial verbatim
recitation of Sec.76-2-306 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.).

'

You are instructed that voluntary intoxication through
consumption by the defendant of either alcohol or
drugs is not a defense to a criminal charge unless
such intoxication negates the existence of the mental
state necessary for the commission of the crimes
charged or the included offenses. [End of instruction].
The instruction omits the following language constituting the
balance of that section:
However> if recklessness or criminal negligence
establishes an element of an offense and the actor
is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution
for that offense. [Emphasis added].
The effect of intoxication on charges of criminal homicide
has perplexed courts and legislatures for years.

Under the Utah

Criminal Code repealed in 1973 murder was defined as "The un l aw f u ll
killing of a human being with malice aforethought", with certain
circumstances, primarily circumstances amounting to premediditation,
making a murder first degree.

The balance of all other homicides

which would have constituted murder at the common law were second
degree murder.

Manslaughter was defined as the "unlawful killing

of a human being without malice"; Sections 76-30-1, 76-30-3, and
Sec.76-30-5, Utah Code (1953), as amended.

Malice was defined by

Sec.76-30-2, Utah Code Annot. (1953) , as follows:
Such malice may be express or implied. It is
express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending
the killing"show an abandoned and malignant heart.
The general rule as to the status of an intoxicated actor under
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such provisions is:
It is now generally held that intoxication may be
considered where murder is divided into degrees,
and in many states, may have the effect of reducing
homicide from murder in the first degree to murder
in the second degree. In fact, in most states, the
only consideration given to the fact of drunkeness
or intoxication at the time of the commission of
a homicide is to enable the court and jury to determine whether the prisoner may be guilty of murder
in the second degree, rather than of murder in the
first degree. The rule followed in most courts is
that intoxication will not reduce a homicide from
murder to manslaughter. ...
In some states, however, either by virtue of particular statutes, or according to a general principal
of law, intoxication may reduce murder to manslaughter.
Where murder has not been divided into degrees, this
position seems logical enough. Where it has been
divided into degrees, the particular statutes defining
second degree murder must be considered, and if a
specific intent to take life is required to constitute
murder in the second degree, drunkeness of the accused
may be such as to reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. 40 Am.Jur.2d, Homicide, Sec.129 at pp.420-22.
That the majority rule was (at least under our prior law) the law
in Utah (see People v. Calton, 5 U.151, 16 P.902 and State v.
Thompson, 110 U.113, 170 P.2d 153) is irrelevant because the jury
in this case was never made aware of it.

This jury was never

instructed what verdict it must find if it found appellant was
under the influence of drugs.

Thus a jury of laymen was required

to solve a difficult legal problem without the benefit even of
the modest guidance provided by Sec.76-2-306. Three possible solutions were available to it.
First, it could have ignored the instructions and found
appellant guilty of first degree murder even if it thought he was
intoxicated to the point where his actions were not knowing and
intentional.

Second, it could have tried to fit intoxication into

the instructions given and tried to arrive at a "proper" verdict.
Third, it could have determined that voluntary intoxication doesn't
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that if it thought appellant was intoxicated it must acquit him.
By hypothetical analysis let us examine the thought
processes of legally unsophisticated jurors who will more than
likely be greatly influenced by ngut reactions."

It is evident

from the verdict that all twelve of the jurors were convinced that
appellant dealt death to the two victims.

Once the jury reached

that conclusion, the moral insult involved in the alternative of
acquittal, even if they thought appellant killed the victims while
intoxicated, is so great as to totally preclude any meaningful
analysis of it, either on the theory that,!Tif that's the case,
my conscience wonTt let me abide it,11 or that "the theory is so
stupid that we must be wrong to have considered it.11

If the jury

adopts the second alternative the instructions create a paradox
from which there is no escape. The average layman would, upon a
finding of intoxication, likely conclude that appellant could not
have acted "knowingly or intentionally" as those terms were defined
by the court.

It follows that the jury could not convict of first

or second degree murder under subparagraph (a) of Section 76-5-203
(barring the multiple homicide provision of 76-5-202 to be discussed
hereafter).

Hence, it must seek a solution in subparagraphs (b)

and (c) of Section 76-5-203.
foreclosed.

(b) requires "intent" which is already

(c), however, offers escape since at first glance

it requires only "recklessness."

i^gain, however, regular "reckless-

ness" won't do, because this subsection requires recklessness
in "circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life."
Question:

"How can you be 'indifferent1 if you are so intoxicated

that you have lost your capacity to understand risk?"
"You can't."

Answer:

No clear resolution appears because the last sentence
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We probably can!t convict of second

not instructed.

Conclusion ;

degree at all,'1

Hence, !?Let!s examine manslaughter.11

Proposition:

"The judge said i\re can convict of manslaugh-

ter if we think Standrod "recklessly" killed these people or did
so "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."
The judge said a person is "reckless with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct, ... when he is aware of but consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances
exist or the result will occur (T.1664)."

"'Awareness1 and 'con-

sciousness' are inconsistent with intoxication, so that doesn't
fit."

Again, the failure to instruct the last sentence of Sec.

76-2-307 has left the jury without legal information necessary
to a fair and meaningful consideration of this possible verdict.
"As to 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' the judge told
us what that is —
Extreme mental or emotional disturbance, as referred
to in this instruction, is that which might result
from extreme provocation that would give rise to
irristible passion in the mind of a reasonable man
or upon sudden quarrel or other circumstances which
reasonably explain or excuse the conduct. Such circumstances are to be judged and the reasonableness
of the explanation or excuse for the conduct are to
be determined from the viewpoint of a person in
the defendant's situation at the time of the alleged
homicides under the circumstances as he believes them
to be (T.1667); —
and it is not applicable on the evidence.

Since there is no claim

of "justification" we can't find him guilty of manslaughter.
this result:
THE FOREMAN: Since we all think he did it, I think
we should convict him of first degree.
JUROR; But for that, we must find that he acted
knowingly or intentionally or at least more culpably
than with mere recklessness. We all think he was
drugged.
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problems. I'm too confused and hungry to solve

Hence,

them. I say to heck with it* Let's ignore that
requirement and convict him of first degree. After
all, we can always recommend life over death and
salve our consciences that way.
ELEVEN JURORS: We agree.
The legislature has mandated the existence of the defense of intoxication to specific intent crimes.

Neither it nor the court gave

it any rational meaning to the twelve laymen who decided appellant's
fate; thus, due process was denied.

(For the proper definition

of fTdue process" see dissenting opinion of Justice Maughan in State
v. Phillips, No,13816 in the Supreme Court of Utah, 9/18/75).
This court must, consistent with its traditional judicial role
in construing statutes, forge a rule to be clearly applied in the
retrial of this case and in others based on similar facts.
Three possible rules present themselves.

First, the court

could adopt the position impliedly taken by the trial court in
this case and require juries to be instructed to acquit if they
find perpetrators of criminal homicides to have been intoxicated.
This rule is unacceptable because it flies in the face of the
Legislature's obvious intent to limit the Sec.76-2-306 defense
only to specific intent crimes.

Further, such a rule would be

so inconsistent with common sense and traditional standards of
conduct that juries would ignore it (probably with justification).
Thus, due process would always be violated in such cases.
Second, this Court can rule that, despite evidence that
a defendant's conduct falls within the "circumstances" set forth
in Sec.76-5-202, a first degree verdict is precluded if the defendant is sufficiently intoxicated, but the jury may convict
intoxicated actors of second degree under Sec. 76-5-203(c) which
requires "[reckless]... conduct which creates a grave risk of death
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ference to human life.1-1 This is the only second degree provision
which fits because paragraphs (a) and (b) both appear to reouire
specific intent, and paragraph(d) is inapplicable.
violence to the

This rule does

?f

circumstancen scheme of' Sec. 76-5-202 and, though

it is consistent with the majority common law rule, may not be
justified under the limiting strictures of this Courtfs role in
statutory construction.
The third rule is clearly preferable though the legislature may have rendered an already difficult problem impossible
by its deletion of the phase "under circumstances not constituting
manslaughter" from Sec.76-5-202 by a 1975 amendment not applicable
to this case.

To be most consistent with the 1973 statutory scheme

the trial court should have instructed that if the jury found appellant to have been too intoxicated to act knowingly and intentionally
it must find him guilty of manslaughter on one of two theories:
either that his conduct was reckless (so that the uninstructed
portion of Sec.76-2-307 would have been relevant to permit conviction); or, more appropriately, that sufficient voluntary intoxication constitutes "extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse."

It is signifi-

cant that this section uses the word "disturbance" as opposed
to the "mental disease or defect" language of Sec.76-2-305, supra,
related to the defense of insanity.

Under a common sense and use

analysis of the word "disturbance" one is mentally "disturbed"
when, by reason of hallucinogenic drugs, his mind is not functioning
in a normal fashion.

The requirement that there be a "reasonable

explanation" for the mental disturbance is clearly satisfied when
it is proven that the defendant has ingested hallucinogenic drugs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

because the scientific
data that
such
do cause mental "disMachine-generated
OCR, may
contain drugs
errors.

turbanceM is abundant,
A second instructional error occurs at T.1665 where,
though the court instructs that nyou cannot find murder in the first
degree under circumstances which constitute manslaughter/1 it failed

i

States Supreme Court, without dissent, not only struck down a Maine

i
i
i

statute which placed on defendant the burden of proving by a fair

I

to instruct that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the circumstances of the crime did not constitute manslaughter.
The ommission is reversible error.
U.S.

•

In Mull aney vV Wilbur,

, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 95 S.Ct.''_

(June 1975), the United

preponderance of the evidence that he acted in the uheat of passion
on sudden provocation" (before he was entitled to be convicted
of manslaughter rather than murder), but clearly held (at 44 L.Ed.2d
522):
We therefore hold that the due process clause requires
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide case. [Emphasis added].
In reliance on Mullaney, the Kings County New York Supreme
Court in People v. Balogun, _ _ _ N.E.

, 17 Cr.L. 2486 (8/19/75)

held unconstitutional a state statute providing:
... It is an affirmative defense [to a murder charge]
that ... (a) the defendant acted under the influence
of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was
a reasonable explanation or excuse ...
The substantive language of that provision w&s almost identical to
Sec. 76-5-202, U.C.A. (1974 Pocket Supp.) except that it placed

I
I
]
I
'-.

the burden of showing such circumstances on the defendant whereas

I

our law is silent on burden of proof.

I

Silence in the instructions

to the jury in this case cannot suffice as a constitutional substitute to clear instruction that the state had the burden of proving |
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that appellant's alleged acts did not

f

constitute manslaughter as is required by Mullaney, supra.
Mullaney has a further application to the partial defense
of intoxication which is, like the New York provision invalidated
in Balogun, an affirmative defense under Sec.76-2-308, U.C.A. (1974*
Pocket Supp.). In the instant case there was ample evidence that
appellant was intoxicated on October 20, 1975, so that that issue
was "properly presented/1

In Maine "heat of passionn and in New

York "extreme mental disturbance" are partial defenses to murder.
In Utah "intoxication" is a partial defense which should reduce
first degree murder to second degree or manslaughter.

The statute

which requires defendants to prove intoxication is unconstitutional.
As to our manslaughter section as a whole, the Legislature, when
it first enacted Sec.76-5-202, the section under which this case
was tried, recognized the very proposition enunciated in Mullaney,
and prohibited conviction of murder "under circumstances constituting manslaughter."

It was by afterthought (and perhaps as part

of what is beginning to look like a deliberate, perverse, and
continuing effort to render our entire criminal code unconstitutional) that the Legislature undid itself by permitting the burden
of proving "circumstances constituting manslaughter" to be placed
back on defendants.

Mullaney,as Furman, supra, is the law.

is not unreasonable, absurd
ereignty.

It

or an offensive insult to state sov-

While this court must reverse this case because of the

errors in the instructions discussed in this Point, in doing so
it easily could and should enlist Utah in the forefront of pro-',
gressive states by adopting the rule of Mullaney and requiring
that juries in all murder cases be instructed that they must find
that

the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime

is not manslaughter before it can convict a defendant of murder.
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Trial courts and lawyers in this state need this kind of specific
guidance.
POINT V.

Providing it is the clear duty of this Court.
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE PROMISES OR AGREEMENTS NOT TO PROSECUTE
WITNESSES AND ACCESSORIES DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS.
In GigTio v. United States, 40 5 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d

104, 92 S.Ct. 763 (1972) the Supreme Court of the United States,
citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, authoritatively held that
a prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose to the jury an
''understanding or agreement" as to the future prosecution of a
witness.

The basis of the holding was that
When the "reliability of a given witness may well
be determinative of guilt or innocence," nondisclosure
of evidence affecting credibility falls within [the
general rule derived from Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 at 87, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963),
"that suppression of material evidence justifies
a new trial irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution.'"]

A violation of this duty necessititates a new trial if it can fairly
be said that the testimony of the witness involved was material,
that is, if there is any "reasonable likelihood [it would] have
affected the judgment of the jury;"
Napue, supra, at 271.

Giglio, supra, at 154, citing

The Giglio court stated that credibility

of the witness there involved was an important issue in the case
and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was
entitled to know it.
In the instant case the testimony of Richard Higgins
and Paul Kunzel was the primary evidence against appellant and
certainly the most damaging. Kunzel said he heard the shots, took
about sixty seconds in walking into the cabin, and saw appellant
standing near the south door of the cabin; while Kunzel saw no weapon
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did say that appellant had

a strange look on his face and that appellant said something
to the effect of "So-what, you've got a little blood on you."
Statement of Facts, supra, P.6.

Higgins1 testimony was even more

He didnft distinguish a weapon, but saw flames coming

critical.

from appellant at the time he heard shots, saw the wounds, and saw
the male victim crying as he was trying to rise.

Statement of Facts,

supra, p.5.
The foregoing establishes two errors in appellant's trial.
A.

No disclosure was made to the jury of what must

have been at least an implied agreement not to prosecute Higgins
and Kunzel,

Candice Earle and Layton Roselund were initially

charged with first degree murder and later granted immunity.
However, Higgins and Kunzel were not arrested, charged, nor granted
immunity.

While appellant can point to no evidence of an agreement

by the state that they would not be prosecuted, it is inconceiveable
that they did not at least have an "understanding", Giglio, supra,
that they would not be prosecuted if their testimony at trial was
substantially similar to earlier statements they had given to investigatory and prosecutorial people.

That Higgins had an "understanding"

with the state which he felt was contingent on the quality of his
testimony may be demonstrated by contrasting his serious equivocation
in identifying appellant as the killer when questioned by defense
counsel (T.799) with his carefully structured and impermissibly leading rehabilitation on that issue at the hands of the prosecutor after
the lunch recess (T.813).

It is obvious that the credibility of

these two witnesses was a crucial question in appellant's trial,
and the jury was entitled to know of any understanding on their
part as to a future prosecution as an aid to assessing the credibility of their testimony.

Yet the State, far from being candid about
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the situation, at least obscured the issue if it did not outright
mislead the jury.

In closing argument the prosecution said the

following, at T.1762-63:
Now, now I submit to you that those who helped
bury bodies, those who helped in any way, in this
are accessories after the fact, but they didn't kill
them. We have a right to grant immunity in exchange
for truthful testimony and that we did to [Candice
Larle and Layton Roselund] .
There's no point in
arresting the other two by the time we get these things
to fit. Kunzel came as soon as he actually reached
home and had the contact. Higgins came over voluntarily. You don't need to arrest that kind of
people. If you have to arrest them, you can very
easily wherever they are. You can issue a warrant
for them and bring them back as a material witness
if they won't come, but you don't have to charge
them for something they didn't do because it might
be possible to conceivably charge them. We all have
a sense of duty. We all have an obligation to do
justice, the prosecutors, the police, the judges
and juries. [Emphasis added].
Whether the state could have charged Higgins and Kunzel as
accessories under our new code which repealed Sec.76-1-42,U.C.A.
(1953) as amended is open to question.

Nevertheless, the prosecutor's

rather cavalier statement of the law coupled with the fact that Layton
Roselund (who actually did no more than Higgins and Kunzel) was actually charged with murder, undoubtedly convinced Higgins and Kunzel
that they could be charged and likely convicted if they didn't
properly tow the mark as witnesses.
Telling the jury that the State has a right to grant
a witness immunity in exchange for "truthful" testimony (which
is an incorrect statement of the law in any event; see argument
immediately following) is an obvious implication that the testimony
of the witness has been truthful.

To immediately follow that state-

ment by saying that two other witnesses, and the most crucial,
did not even have to be arrested because of the kind of people
that they were
is a completely unwarranted bolstering of the witDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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nesses1 testimony, especially given the state's obfuscation of
the critical issue, i.e. the testimony must have been given by
the witnesses in the expectation that if it was the witnesses would
not be prosecuted.
Based on the holding of Gigllo, supra, appellant's conviction should therefore be reversed.

See also U.S. v. Tashman,

478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1973) in which the appellant's co-defendant
had negotiated an agreement to plead guilty to one count in exchange
for a joint recommendation, subsequently honored by the court.
The agreement was finalized in proceedings from which the appellant
and his counsel had been excluded.

The circuit reversed due to

the government's failure to disclose the plea and sentence of the
co-defendant to appellant prior to trial with the following language
at 131:
The action of counsel for Osbrach and the Government
acquiesced in by the court, was so prejudicial ... as
to require a new trial. Being unaware of what had occurred behind the closed doors of the courtroom,appellants had no effective way of combatting the damaging
testimoy elicited by the Government from Osbrach. ...
Under the circumstances the jury had no way of knowing
what interest Osbrach had in testifying.
We need not speculate on what effect knowledge of
the secret contingent agreement would"TTave had on
the jury. The Supreme Court has made it clear that
the failure of the government to disclose to a jury
plea-bargaining negotiations with a key witness deprives
a defendant of constitutional due process. [Emphasis added]
Armour v. Salisbury, 492 F.2d 1932 (6th Cir.1974) is also squarely
in point.

In that case the conviction was reversed by reason of

a statement made by the prosecutor to the jury that a key witness
(who had received certain assurances from the prosecutor regarding
assistance in obtaining probation) had nothing to gain by testifying.
That is exactly what happened in the case at bar when the jury was
told during closing
argument that the State "did not need to arrest
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that kind of people*"
(T)he basic tenent of Giglio does not depend on whether
misleading information was given to the jury in the
form of a closing argument by a prosecutor rather
than through the testimony of a witness . ... The
critical error was that the prosecutor deliberately
misled the jury by assuring it that [the witness]
had nothing to gain by giving his testimony;"
Armour, supra, at 10 37.
Finally, attention is called to Birkholder v. State,
493 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Ct.Cr.App/ 1973) which makes it abundantly
clear that the Texas court's reading of Giglio does not require,
as a condition of reversal, even disclosure to the witness himself
that immunity from prosecution has been granted.

In Birkholder

a lawyer told his client only that if he would testify
help him".

ff

it would

In reversing for failure to disclose this to the jury,

the court stated:
One reasonable inference to be drawn from [the witness T actions in denying knowledge of the deal in
a qualified way] is that he knew of the Stateys
plan not to prosecute but also knew not to mention
it for fear of jeopardizing the entire scheme.
Whether or not this is true is not for us to decide.
The point is that the jury should have been given
the opportunity to decide [the witness'] credibility
for itself. The trial court's refusal to require the
disclosure of the State's plan not to prosecute [the
witness] deprived the jury of that function. [Emphasis added].
B,

All parties to the trial misconstrued and misstated

the effect of the immunity statute, thus depriving the jury of
an additional critical factor in assessing the testimony of key
witnesses.

The grant of immunity to Layton Roselund was disclosed

to the jury, at T.991, as follows:
Q. Now, you were initially charged with this crime
with other people; were you not?
A. Correct.
Q. You were granted immunity by the State in ex'change for your truthful testimony; were you not?
' A. That is correct. [Emphasis added].
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at T.1116 as follows:
Q. Now, it is true, is it not, Miss Earle, that you
were arrested at the same time the defendant and Mr.
Roselund were arrested?
A. I was.
Q. Arrested in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. It is also true, is it not, that the State has
granted immunity from any prosecution in this case in
' exchange for your personal testimony? [Emphasis addecF].
It is obvious that the State's counsel did not wish to
imply to the jury that Candice Earle's testimony was truthful.
As to her he made the exchange for "personal" testimony, yet in
every other mention of immunity to the jury his exchange was for
"truthful" testimony; T.1762; T.991; and see T.1257-1264.

Of

course, Ms. Earle's testimony had not been particularly helpful
to the State, and she was at least appellant's roommate if not what
the State referred to as his "commonlaw wife", and she is now Mrs.
Standrod.
The point is that the State does not grant immunity in
exchange for anything, let alone "truthful testimony.", The relevant
statute is 77-45-21 Utah Code Annot.(1974 Pocket Supp.) which provides as follows:
In any investigation or prosecution of a criminal
case [the State] shall have the power to grant immunity from prosecution to any person ... called as a witness in behalf of the State of Utah whenever the [State]
deems that the testimony of such person is necessary
to the investigation or prosecution of such a case. No
prosecution shall be instituted against a person for
any crime disclosed by his testimony which is privileged
under this action (sic) provided that should the person
testify falsely, nothing contained herein shall be
construed to prevent prosecution for perjury.
The legislative intent of that section was obviously
to force the testimony of a witness who is otherwise unwilling
to testify.
exchange.

The gist of the section is compulsion rather than
If Layton Roselund was being compelled to testify the
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jury was entitled to know that fact in order to assess his credibility.

The State on the other hand planted the unwarranted im-

pression in the jury's mind that his testimony was necessarily
"truthful" since it was given in exchange for immunity.
ratified the attempt.

The Court

At T.1257:

THE COURT: ... (B)asically ... the statute is ...that
the State...could grant immunity at any stage in the
proceedings in return for the truthful testimony of a
witness and that, in the event the testimony was not true,
then the immunity was no longer in force. Now, that is
in essence. Is that right, counsel? [Emphasis added].
MR. MCCARTHY; Yes.
Wrong,

And earlier in the proceedings the Court had instructed

the jury as follows, at T.1237:
•..(D)uring the recess the Court checked the transcript
and ... the law and thought maybe a word of explanation
that the Court has advised both counsel the immunity
factor. It is not material; it is not relevant. * ..
[Emphasis added].
Of course, a grant of immunity to any key witness remains throughout
a critically material factor vis-a-vis the jury's ability to access
the credibility of the witness.

Even though defense counsel obvious-

ly didnft fully understand the immunity concept either, he did
request a pertinent instruction which the court refused at T.1639:
THE COURT: ... Instruction No.C where the prosecuting
attorney has made promise of immunity and you asked
the Court to instruct that it is not regarded with
favor and should be closely scrutinized. That's denied.
If refusal of that instruction was not error, error was committed
in that the court never did adequately explain the consequences
of a grant of immunity, instruct as to immunity being a factor
affecting credibility, and it (the court) misled the jury regarding
the materiality of grants of immunity by ratifying the state's
reference to such grants as being in exchange for "truthful11 testimony.

The error is so plain and fundamental that appellant's

conviction should
beHoward
reversed.
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POINT VI. APPELLANTS CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED
IN VIOLATION OF FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The problem with this case is that it is at best a manslaughter case which resulted in a first degree murder conviction,
leading one to wonder how the state accomplished this feat.

The

following violations of appellant1s Fifth Amendment rights certainly
contributed.
A,

Violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

When law enforcement officers arrived at appellantfs
cabin they asked appellant to identify himself.

According to the

testimony of David G. Little (T.565) appellant indicated that he
was Standrod and acknowledged that he knew Richard Frank Higgins
and had come from Las Vegas within the last two or three days*
Trooper Little testified that appellant then said, M I donTt want
to say anything more about it."

It was at that point appellant

was placed under arrest for first degree murder and given a Miranda
warning which though not seriously deficient, was misleading: "You
can decide at any time to exercise these rights and not answer
any questions or make any statements."
Appellant was then handcuffed, "And from that point there
was some conversation that took place.

I asked one or two questions

and then someone else asked some questions;"

testimony of Trooper

Little at T.566.
At the trial the state took great pains to emphasize
that everything related to appellant's arrest and investigation
'was right and proper, this in order to emphasize for the jury a
supposed implication of guilt from a statement then made by appellant. At T.568-569;
Q, (By Mr. McCarthy): Now, Trooper Little, what
was the reason that you read the Miranda warning
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*

A. Well, the main reason was to make certain that
it was right and proper and to secure the arrest.
&

& "k

m
™

Q. Was there any other conversation in the defendant's
presence between any of the officers and any of the
persons arrested that you can now recall?
V
v
A. There was some conversation that took place.
I do remember that information was volunteered —
and the other two subjects that had been placed under
arrest.
Q. What information was that?
A. The defendant made a statement that it was an
accident. He, I might describe -0. Please do. Set up the situation.
A. The situation. We were all standing in front
of the sheriff's car, right in front of the car,
and he sat back and he leaned on the front of the
car and he shuffled his feet, and he would look up
into the air and he shook his head and he said,"This
was an accident."

I
•
I
I
•
I

I
"
I
I
•

Just to make sure that the jury didn't miss anything
the state had Deputy Sheriff Stephan C. Turner testify that after

I

the "Miranda" warning he heard appellant say that it was an accident;
(T.581).

I
l

The state had a little more difficulty in getting the
information out of Officer Francis J. Kelley (at T.587):
Q. (By Mr. McCarthy): Officer Kelley, let me go
I
back a little further in your testimony: aside from
'
your answer to the question by the defendant, yes,
he knew why you were there, apparently, was there
I
any other statement made by the defendant prior to
•
the time you went up the hill that you recall?
A. Yes. He said it was an accident and that he
I
kept trying to xvake them up.
|
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct.
.
1602 (1966) clearly establishes that admission of the testimony
concerning this statement of defendant's was an error of constitutional
proportions.

At the outset it is clear that the Miranda requirement

of in custody interrogation was here met inasmuch as appellant had
been arrested for first degree murder.

It is equally clear that

after appellant
said
that
"heLawdidn't
want
sayBYU.
anything more about
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it" the officers were not entitled to question him further and
anything he did say as a result of further questioning was inadmissable.

In Miranda the Supreme Court clearly stated, at 384 U.S.

473, that
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes
to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.
At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot
be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise. (Emphasis added).
The substance of the Miranda opinion, of course, was to ensure that
the individual's constitutional right to chose between silence and
speech is not ignored or evaded by law enforcement officials, and
thus its emphasis on the necessity of demonstrating procedural
safeguards and effective apprisal

of rights.

The Court stated

at 384 U.S. 467:
We have concluded that without proper safeguards
the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently
compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to
speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.
In order to combat these pressures and to permit
a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against
self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately
and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise
of tITose rights must be fully honored. [Emphasis addedj .
A once stated warning, delivered by those who will
conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice
to [the end of assuring that the individual's right
to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered] among those who most require' knowledge of
their rights. A mere warning given by the interrogators
is not alone sufficient to accomplish that end;
Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 469.
That the once stated warning given in this case was ineffective
is apparent for several reasons

First, appellant said that he

did not want to say anything further, yet the police officers
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
questioned himDigitized
andby the
heHoward
made
theLawstatement
inLawquestion.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Second,

there is massive evidence in the record about the use of drugs
by all parties involved on the day prior to appellant's arrest
and the overall tenor of the record casts grave

doubt on

the proposition that appellant was free from the influence of drugs
at the

time of his arrest and the receipt of the warning.

This

is further substantiated by the statement taken by police officers
from appellant approximately two-and-one-half days later, a transcript
of which statement is found following R.17.

This Court need only

read briefly through that statement to become convinced that even
at that time defendant was obviously confused and incoherent, thus
rendering absurd any argument that he "knowingly and intentionally"
waived his privilege against self-incrimination.

Miranda, 384 U.S.

at 475.
This error would perhaps not be substantially a serious
one if the testimony had just come in and the state had not attempted
to capitalize upon it.

Having laid the ground work however, the

state did not fail to seize the opportunity to milk the statement
for more than it was reasonably worth.

In closing argument, at

T.1697, the state argued:
Then the other inconsistency with that statement
is that: remember when they first saw the police
car? What did he actually do? He went out to cover
up the mattress
and then heTs got to
get this thing off his conscience so when the police
were there do you remember the first thing he told
them? "There's been an accident" and that was as
far as it went.
In its final closing argument at T.761 £t seq. , the state had the
following to say:
I don't know why for sure why he killed those people.
It's only in his power to tell and if you remember,
one of the first things Trooper Little did was give
the Miranda warning. ... They have a right to raise
these rights and the whole thing is there in Exhibit
1 if I recall correctly. He says it's an accident
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and he realizes he doesn't have to say anything more.
Maybe, Candy tells him to shut up. I don't know.
*

*

#

*

Nov/, I think we have hammered this enough. I think you can
see why we don't have to prove motive. Motive is within
the ability of the defendant to tell us 5ut we can't foTce
him to talk. We can't grill him until he breaks... \ Ft
went out long ago which is why we have that kind of a flag.
You don't torture a man, you-don't put him in a chamber,
for example, and you can't run him through an inquisition.
We respect the man's rights. [Emphasis added].
The state's contention that because appellant said it was an
accident he was somehow admitting guilt was, by itself, prejudicial,
the implication being that the statement containing an affirmative
statement of what had happened, contradicted appellant's in-court denial of any knowledge of the circumstances of the killings. Had the
statement been used in rebuttal it may have been admissible; Oregon
v. Hassy

U.S.__,43 L.Ed.2d 570,95 S.Ct.

(1975),but its admission

as direct evidence in the state's case in chief violated Miranda.
B.

Comment on appellant's silence.

The statement quoted supra, this page, was a direct comment by
the state upon the fact that appellant exercised his Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent. Evidence that appellant did so has no probative
value, but does have a substantial potential for prejudice. "The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the defendant's previous silence than is warranted,fl and it creates a "strong
negative inference" in the mind of the jury; U. S. v. Hale, U.S.
L.Ed.2d 99, 107, 95 S.Ct.

,45

(1975). The Hale opinion concluded that "re-

spondent's silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and...any reference to his silence under such circumstances
carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact."
Miranda,supra, simply prohibited such evidence at n.37,384 U.S.
468:
...[I]t
is impermissible to penalize an individual for exerDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore,
use the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.
See also, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L.Ed.2d
106,

85 S.Ct. 1229 (1965):
(T)he Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to
the federal government, and its bearing on the states
by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids either
comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence
or instruction by the court that such silence is
evidence of guilt.

In U.S. v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (1970) the prosecution elicited
testimony from the arresting officer that he had given the defendant
the Miranda warning; the officer was then asked if the defendant
made any further statement to him, to which he answered, ,fno".
In closing argument the government argued (reported at 206):
On the otherhand, you have the testimony of the
federal agents who have thoroughly inventoried everything and advised the defendant of his constitutional
rights, and he made no statement.
Wouldn't you think if all he is doing is a little
experiment he would say to the agents, "My gosh,
there is a mistake here, hold it.M
* ft ft ft

And as far as him making any statement to them or
telling them anything, they gave him what is under
the law the full advisement of his constitutional
rights and he made no statements. He didn't explain
anything. Complete silence.
The Court stated:
Since the Miranda warnings here given were not intended
as a foundation for the admission of a voluntary
inculpatory statement of the defendant, this testimony
served
no probative purpose and did no more than
turn on the red light of potential prejudice involving
the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. We are
inclined to the view that this testimony, standing
alone, might well be considered harmless, but such
is not this case [because of the closing argument
quoted above].
ft ft ft ft

In
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588], we clearly stated that the constitutional right
to remain silent at the time of arrest was as fundamental as the right not to testify and neither could
be subject of argumentative comment by the prosecution.
We there stated that to do so was error "so plain,
fundamental, and serious that we should consider
it, although timely objection was not made thereto
in the trial court/1

We decline to weigh comparative prejudice wrhen the calibrator" can only be the quantity of comment violative^
of constitutional rights. [Emphasis addedj.
The final opinion clearly eliminates any quibble the state
may wish to make about waiver by non-objection.

See also, State

v. Scott, 22 U.2d 27, 447 P.2d 908 (1968) and State v. Cobo, 90
U.89 P. 2d 95 (1936).

In addition, the fact that appellant took

the stand and testified at his trial can be of no help to the state,
because the state introduced the testimony it its case in chief.
If the testimony had not been introduced there ivould certainly have
been less reason for appellant to testify (in an attempt to explain
the testimony); see argument at pp.35-36, supra.
POINT VII.THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED
PURSUANT TO AN INVALID SEARCH WARRANT.
At approximately 2:00 oTclock p.m. on October 22nd, 1973,
two days after the killings and one day after the afternoon upon
which appellant, Candice Earle and Layton Roselund were arrested,
Julian B. Fox, a Highway Patrol Sergeant, presented an Affidavit
in support of a Motion for a Search Warrant to Clifford Heaton,
Justice of the Peace of Kane County.
sworn to by Fox

The Affidavit subscribed and

is attached hereto as Appendix A.

Pursuant to

the Affidavit, Heaton issued a search warrant, attached as Appendix
B, which commanded seizure from the property of appellant of the
following:
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One or more corpse buried upon said property, lethal
weapons, drugs, chemicals, blood stains, finger prints,
,,
foot prints, shovels or tools used for the purpose of
burying bodies, blood stained rugs, clothing and equipment. -1
Acting on the warrant, on the afternoon of the 22nd, officers seized

m

i
a large number of items from appellant's premises, including but
not limited to those set forth on the penciled notation appended

j

to the Return attached hereto as Appendix B(l).

-

Sergeant Fox, however, the affiant upon whose word the

™

warrant was issued, did not have personal knowledge of any of the
facts set forth in his Affidavit.

I

The only statement of "underlying

facts" required by Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Ut.471, 93 P.2d 920, is

|

contained in paragraphs two and three of the Affidavit, i.e., 2."...

-

affiant received notification from a member of the Las Vegas Police
Department that a witness had reported to them that a murder had .

1

been committed in Kane County ... and that the victims had been
buried...[and that certain individuals had been present]."

During

|
m

the trial, however, Fox admitted that he had never talked to any

member of the Las Vegas Police Department, but had received information
concerning the murders from a Sergeant Pierson of the Utah Highway
Patrol, and from reading a radio log. P.T.85*

I

Thus, all the infor-

mation which he had when he approached Clifford Heaton for a search
warrant was triple hearsay from an informant.

|

••"••"'•

The second set of operative underlying facts is contained
in paragraph three wherein Fox swears that he was present, with

'
I

other police officers, at Navajo Lakes at a time when Kenneth Standrod, Candice Earle, and Layton Roselund, after having been advised

J

of their rights,ndid voluntarily acknowledge that two persons...

g

were killed in the home...[and] that their bodies were buried...
*"P. T. "IFeTFrences
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upon property where the home is situated.M
false.

This statement was

Trooper Little of the Utah Highway Patrol said he went to

the cabin site on the late affternoon of October 21st with Trooper
Steve Turner and Francis Kelley and Norman Swapp of the Kane County
Sheriff's Office (P.T.75-77), and that they arrested Roselund,
Earle, and Standrod and transported them to the Kane County Jail*
The first time Julian Fox ever got to the premises was at approximately 9:30 o'clock a.m. on the 22nd,at which time all of the
persons present when the police first arrived on the 21st had been
transported to jail.(P.T.81).

Therefore, any information Fox had

was hearsay derived by him from some person who is unnamed in the
Affidavit.
The Supreme Court of the United States has dealt exhaustively
with the technical requirements of affidavits in support of search
warrants and particularly those related to the extent to which hearsay information may be utilized.
In Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 11 L.Ed.2d
887, 84 S.Ct. 825 (1964),rehearing denied 377 U.S. 940, the Court
clearly indicated that hearsay is competent as the basis of a
search warrant and ruled that despite minor factual inaccuracies
(not going to the integrity of the personal knowledge of the affiant)
affidavits are sufficient even though the identity of the informant
delivering the information is withheld.

Only months later, in

Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, 84 S.Ct. 1509,(1964),
the Court examined for the first time the question of the quality
required of hearsay before it is sufficient to justify the issuance
of a warrant.

The Court set forth a rule, still controlling,

which the headnote writer summarized as follows:
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reciting that
the affiant received reliable infor-

mation from a credible person, and that affiant believed, that narcotics were being kept at described
premises for illegal sale and use, is not sufficient
to establish probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant, since the affidavit states mere conclusions of an unidentified informant and contains
no affirmative allegations that the affiant or the
informer spoke with personal knowledge of the matters
contained in the affidavit.
One year later the Court decided U.S.' vY Ventre'sca, 380 U.S. 102,
13 L.Ed.2d 684, 85 S.Ct. 741 (1965) in which the
was reaffirmed.

Aguilar holding

The court stated that affidavits may be based

on hearsay if the basis for the credibility of the hearsay statements
is specified, but that mere conclusions were not sufficient.
See, also, McRae v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 18 L.Ed.2d 62, 87 S.Ct.
(1956), rehearing denied 386 U.S. 1042 (1967).
W

In 1969 in Spinelli

U.S., 393 U.S. 410, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969), the

Court, Mr. Justice Harlan speaking for the majority, synthesized
all these cases into a single rule which is still controlling.
The opinion sets forth the following principles, directly applying
t ie

^

A'guiTar» supra, rule: (1) In passing on the validity of a

search warrant, a reviewing court may consider only the information
brought to the attention of the magistrate; (2) Aguilar requires,
and the Court affirms the proposition, that in order to pass constitutional muster an affidavit supporting a search warrant, if
based on hearsay information must first set forth underlying circumstances sufficient to enable the magistrate independently to judge
the validity of the informant's conclusion concerning the substance
of the affidavit.

(3) The affidavit must recite the facts upon

which the affiant relies to conclude that the hearsay information
recited is reliable.

Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion,

sets the rule forth at U.S., 393 as follows:
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report—what is necessary under Aguilar is one of

two things: the informant must declare either (1) that
he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, but
there is good reason for believing it - perhaps one of
the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information*
The affidavit involved in this case (Appendix A) fails the tests set
forth in Aguilar and Spinelli under any construction of the facts.
First, all the statements made in the affidavit subscribed by Julian
Fox were false, by his own subsequent admission.

Second, all the

information Fox had was hearsay derived from other law enforcement
officers who remained unnamed in the affidavit and concerning whose
credibility nothing whatever is said.

Without something on the

face of the affidavit to indicate the source and quality of the
hearsay information it contains, it flies in the face of Aguilar
an

^ Spinelli, both supra.

The third and worst failure concerns

the hearsay from the Las Vegas Police.

For an unidentified witness1

statement to Detective Levos to have been sufficient the affidavit
would have had to recite some information from which the magistrate
could independently find that Higgins was a reliable informant.
But no such information appears on the face of the affidavit and
Julian Fox, the affiant, didn't even have the information directly
from the witness, but had it from the witness through Detective
Levos, then to Trooper Pierson, and then to Fox.

Such a chain is

too tenuous to justify a massive invasion of an individual's privacy.
Thus, under applicable standards the search warrant in this case
is totally inadequate, being based on a fatally defective affidavit.
Hence the search of appellant's cabin was unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution made applicable to the States
through the Fourteen Amendment (see Aguilar, supra, at 378 U.S.
109).

Failure to suppress all evidence seized pursuant thereto
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was reversable error.

Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United
States has ever squarely decided whether a violation of constitutional law by itself justifies reversal, or whether traditional
harmless error standards apply.

Though in normal evidentiary con-

texts the appellant must prove prejudice from evidentiary errors,
where evidence has been obtained through means which violate constitutional strictures the State's duty of demonstrating the harmlessness
of the error seems to increase substantially.
has issued some guidance.

The Supreme Court

In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,

4 L.Ed.2d 242, 80 S.Ct. 274 (1960), it ruled that the use of involuntary confessions requires reversal despite competent evidence
establishing guilt or corroborating the confession.

A similar hold-

ing is contained in Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 9 L.Ed.2d 922,
83 S.Ct. 917 (1963), in reliance upon the application of self incrimination strictures to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The rule regarding the use of evidence obtained through
illegal seizures was originally set forth in Fahy v. Conneticut,
375 U.S. 85, 11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229 (1963) wherein the court
stated, at U.S. 86:
On the facts of this case, it is not now necessary
for us to decide whether the erroneous admission of
evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure
can ever be subject to the normal rules of "harmless
error11 under the federal standard of what constitutes
harmless error... We find that the erroneous admission
of this unconstitutionally obtained evidence at this
petitioner's trial was prejudicial; therefore, the
error was not harmless, and the conviction must be
reversed. We are not concerned here with whether there
was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could
have been convicted without the evidence complained
of. The question is whether there is a reasonable
possib lity that the.evidence complained of might
have contributed to the conviction. [Emphasis added].
A similar rule was stated in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483,
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seized and introduced into evidence items found in Stonerfs hotel
room.

On grounds unrelated to the harmless error proposition,

the Court held that the search was invalid and that the evidence
should have been suppressed.

The Court said, in n.8 at U.S. 490:

The respondent has argued that the case should be
remanded to let the California District Court of Appeal decide whether the admission of this evidence
was harmless error. But the conviction depended in
large part upon the jury's resolution of the question
of the credibility of witnesses, and that determination
must almost certainly have been influenced by the incriminating nature of the physical evidence illegally
seized and erroneously admitted. There is thus at
least ffa reasonable possibility that the evidence complained might have contributed to the conviction.,f
[Citing Fahy, supra][Emphasis added].
This rule, which substantially does away with traditional
harmless error considerations where constitutional violations are
involved, has apparently been enunciated in light of the off-cited
proposition that the protections of the Fourth Amendment are designed neither to unnecessarily inhibit the police nor to aid criminal
defendants, but to protect the right of the populace from unwarranted and unreasonable government invasions of privacy.

See, e.g.

Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 80 S.Ct. 725
(1960) and Aguilar v. Texas, supra.
There is at least "a reasonable possibility, "Stoner
and Fahy, both supra, that the evidence illegally seized and improperly introduced into the trial of this case, over defense objection
(R.47) contributed to appellant's conviction,

The State made

considerable hay in argument and during the presentation of its
evidence out of the allegedly nthorough police investigation11 which
was demonstrated by the introduction of a mass of material seized
from the cabin.

A specific point about thoroughness was made (at

T.1766-7) in excusing the state's failure to establish the location
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was involved.

The state was also more than charitable to its case

when in closing argument the claim was made that all of the physical
evidence corroborated the charge that Standrod fired the weapon
into the victims.

The fact is that the physical evidence generally

contradicts that proposition, but the mass of evidence from the
cabin puts a nice gloss on the prosecutor's statement.

What the

State really said was: "Well, we have an eye-witness and a half
to this murder, and their story is consistent with this huge pile
of evidence.

We certainly didn't miss any bet and if there was

any evidence to the contrary we'd tell you about it.

There isn't,

and the meticulousness of our investigation has convinced us that
Standrod did it and you should be impressed by the same proposition."

That kind of argument was made solely by reason of the

massive evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search warrant,
and could not have been convincingly made but for that.

Thus,

the State fashioned a material "contribution" to the conviction
of appellant in violation of his constitutional rights.
The burden of proving that constitutional error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt" is squarely upon the state.
Chapmanv. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824
(1967).
POINT VIII. THE STATE ABUSED IT'S INVESTIGATIVE "MONOPOLY" AND
THEREFORE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION WAS IN VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE I SECTION 7 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH.
In the field of criminal investigation the state has
a monopoly in every meaningful sense of the word in that it can
focus virtually unlimited manpower, money, specialized equipment,
and scientific skill on whatever or whomever it choses.

The state

has control of the crime scene and the right to possession of all
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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physical evidence.

It can largely determine what items of evidence

are delivered for scientific analysis and the nature of the tests
performed.

The state generally has first access to material wit-

nesses, and thus it can, deliberately or inadvertently, selectively
reinforce or discourage emphasis on certain aspects not only of
the witnesses1 ultimate testimony, but of their very perceptions.'
In contrast, criminal defendants (especially those who,
like appellant, are incarcerated during the critical investigatory
period) have absolutely no role, at least from the critical point
in time (association of counsel), in the discovery, development,
preservation or analysis of the physical evidence upon which a
jury will ultimately rely in exercising its perogative of granting
freedom or destroying a defendants life.

It is clear, then, that

criminal suspects and defendants must trust law enforcement agencies
and prosecutors to preserve their very lives.

The massive advan-

tages and investigative monopoly inherent in the state are a substantial basis for the requirements of our law that the state has
the burden of proving guilt and that guilt must be proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.

Those prophylactic requirements are not suf-

ficient if the state violates that trust.

Police and prosecutors,

after all, are responsible to all of the people, even criminal
defendants,who are not convicts until the jury says so. If the state
abuses its investigative monopoly then defendants, especially because
they must place trust in the police and prosecutors, have not been
rendered all that they are "due" under Article I Section 7 of the
Constitution of Utah because the facts presented to the jury are
incomplete.
Analysis of what ought to be constitutionally required in
the investigation of criminal cases is aided by characterizing criminal investigations as being of two kinds.

The "who done it" is
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typical of the case where there is no immediate or apparent suspect
so that the state is required to conduct a meticulous and "thorough"
investigation in order to develop all aspects of the evidence.
On the other hand, in the "he done it" investigation, the type
conducted in this case, the police think they know who did it and
the scope of the investigation is reduced to a search for evidence
which will inculpate the suspect.

I
3

It is a fundamental psychological

principle (recognition of which has led to judicially created
safeguards against suggestive identification line-ups) that we
see what we are looking for and find what we seek.

An alarming

characteristic of "he done it" investigations is that they proceed
only to the point where the investigators are satisfied that what
they have found will suffice to convict their target.

Evidence

tending to exculpate is ignored as being "not significant," and
reasonable alternative explanations of how and what happened are
not explored.
Instead of aggressively doing a thorough investigation designed to find out what really happened, the police and prosecutors
in this case comfortably basked in the luxury of the "he done it"
syndrome.

Their failure was so egregious as to violate

right to due process.

appellant's

This proposition is demonstrated by three sign

ificant investigatory abuses.
First, the police simply did a sloppy job of investigating
the crime scene.

The location of the deceaseds' shoes and the

dead girl's glasses became an issue at trial, as did her blood
type.

In closing argument the state was reduced to wondering if

i
i
i
i

the male victim's shoes had been hidden in a garbage can (T.1757)

|

and that "maybe we don't check enough brush. The mattress was a

i
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direction in wooded country who knows where it!s going to be;
(T.1767)."

Presumably the same feeble reasoning applied to the

female victim's shoes and glasses, notwithstanding that the prosecutor pointed out in closing argument (T.1766): "This is why
an investigation has to be so careful and meticulous. The photographs of the scene and the dictation onto the machine, the careful
bagging of all of the physical evidence,.. .TT And earlier (T.1765):
"What I am saying is, we are being picked to death on things that
doesn't (sic) matter,"
While

it is understandable that the investigation was

sloppy due to the large number of officers from numerous police
agencies who were tramping around the scene (probably more in the
capacity of curious onlookers than as investigators), appellant
submits that the location of those items of evidence was critically
significant in a manner to be dealt with hereafter.
The second abuse lies in the fact that the state turned
its back on implications obvious on the face of certain physical
evidence and arising from anomalies between the physical evidence
and certain testimony; the implications were inconsistent with the
state's theory, and it therefore neglected and failed to secure additional expert opinion and testimony which was not only obviously
indicated, but was necessary to resolve the conflict.

The mattress

upon which the state claimed the victims were shot and laid for
several hours before burial is apparently constructed of a porous
material.

Yet, it is also apparent from an examination of the

mattress, which is in evidence, that the blood which is apparent
on the mattress did not penetrate beneath the immediate surface.
The state's pathologist in exhibit P-2, noted that there was no
significant blood on the female victim's levis, presumably on either
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the inside or the outside.

There was, however, significant

blood on the outside of her bodyshirt.

m

The stains on the bodvshirt, H
gg

as well as the victim's panties (which were exluded upon an over
zealous motion of defense counsel),were found at a point which

1

would have been covered by her levis had the victim been wearing
them at the time the shirt came into contact with blood.

Since

no one present at the scene indicated that Miss Beaty was unclad

•
I

when she was killed, it is very likely that tests disclosing that
the stains on her underclothing could not have occured when she

1

was wearing the levis"would have contradicted the testimony of

•

Higgins and Kunzel and led the police to examine other alternatives. ."•
Defense counsel's failure to explore this proposition no doubt

|

resulted from his own confidence (bolstered by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963)), that if the

j

state possessed exculpatory evidence it would thoroughly investigate
it and disclose its implications to the defense.

Neither was done.

•

Furthermore, the girl's parka (Exhibit F) contained holes consistent I
with the wounds on her body.

The pathologist on Exhibit 2 indicates

that there was material like the lining of the Parka stuck to the

|

outside of the victim's body around a bullet wound.

,

The obvious

inference is that she was wearing the parka when shot. Yet, neither

•

Kunzel nor Higgins (the only man who claims to have seen her shot)

I

mentions it.

The parka riddle by itself has little significance,

but when coupled with the levis riddle raise's a whole series of
critical questions which remain un-asked and unanswered.

Asking

and answering these questions was the duty of the state.

It failed

in its duty and thereby prejudiced appellant, for it is clear that

j

'
j

the jury must have convicted appellant on the testimony of Higgins
and Kunzel whose testimony was only slightly corroborated by any
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

of the physical evidence.

Appellant owned the murder weapon, but

everyone else had access to it.
but so did Higgins and Kunzel.

Appellant had access to the victims,
They also necessarily had as much

motive as did appellant, since the state was able to prove none.
In that context, anything at all which would further indicate that
they did not see what they claimed to would have served to highlight
the inconsistencies already present in their testimony and thus
would have been tremendously beneficial to appellant. Those inconsistencies are Higgins equivocation about his identification of
appellant and his statement that the rounds were fired at a distance
of two feet from the feet of the victims (supra p, 5) the fact that
the first time he saw Kunzel after the shooting was "right when
I stepped out on the porch; he was coming from the west side of
the cabin.ff

Yet Kunzel who claimed to have entered the cabin from

the rear immediately after the shootings, did not see Higgins
(although they existed the same door), claimed to have seen Standrod
ten feet from the victims1 feet, and upon exiting

said he saw

Higgins coming from the lower area behind Roselund. (Supra, P.5.)
While they both participated in gathering the guns, neither one
would own up to knowing where the murder weapon had been placed
and Higgins said that he picked up the shotgun from the same place
that Kunzel claimed that he did when he used it as an excuse for
going inside the cabin at the time of the shootings.

Since there

was no physical evidence form which guilt could have been found
beyond a reasonable doubt, the truthfulness of Kunzel and Higgins
was of paramount importance.

Both of them acknowledged that appel-

lant either agreed or directed that they leave the cabin, giving
them the opportunity to go straight to the police.

Had appellant

and Candice Earle been the first to report the shootings and claimed
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that Higgins and/or Kunzel shot the two victims somewhere outside
of the cabin, the police likely would have believed that story
since it is actually more supported by the physical evidence, and
the shoes would have been on the other feet.

The fact that the

blood did not penetrate the mattress would seem to indicate that
the bodies were not placed on the mattress for a considerable time
after death.

That is consistent with the proposition that the

girl was killed out in the woods somewhere with her levis off and
her parka on.

The blood on the rock and in the wheelbarrow and

the missing glasses and shoes (which the state seemed to concede
were out in the woods someplace) all support the theory that at leas
one of the victims was killed outside the cabin.
The critical importance of the truthfulness of Higgins
and Kunzel coupled with substantial indications in the physical evidence (obvious to any impartial observer) that their stories were
internally inconsistent and partially false, make it inconceivable
that the state committed a third abuse of its investigatory monopoly
and failed to administer lie detector tests"to its two principle
witnesses.

Although the fact that it did not does not appear of

record, the undersigned represents to this court that a Salt Lake
County officer involved in the investigation informed the undersigned that lie detector tests were not administered nbecause we
didn't need to since their stories were credible."

Of course,

their stories also confirmed the state's theory that "appellant
did it."

"It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor knowingly

to offer false evidence... ." A.B.A. Standards, The Prosecution
Function, Section 5.6 (1971),

Appellant does not mean to suggest

that the state in this case knowingly used false testimony.
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unwitting use of false testimony the state must take reasonable
steps to ascertain that the testimony that it does present is true.
The situation is akin to one which presented itself in the case
of United States v. Banks, 383 F.Supp. 389 (W.D.S.D. 1974) which
produced the following statement, at 394:
It is fair to say, giving the government the most
favorable finding possible, that the testimony and
documentary evidence contradicting Moves Camp was
more believable than his testimony. The mere fact
that there was conflicting testimony is not unusual.
What is disturbing, however, is that the prosecutor
could have and should have conducted a more thorough
investigation of"Moves Camp and his tenative testimony
and he failed to do so. Had a lie detector test
been administered it is quite likely that Moves Campfs
questionable credibility would have been discovered.
[Emphasis added].
While lie detector test results are not yet generally admissible
in our courts, there are few that would still question their
validity as lie detection or truth verification techniques.

Their

inadmissibility results from judicially created or recognized
policies unrelated to their liability.

Barland, Gordon H., § Raskin,

David C., Department of Psychology, University of Utah, reprinted
from: Electrodermal Activity in Psychological Research, Academic
Press, Inc. (1973); The Validity of the Polygraph Technique, Barland,
Gordon H., Department of Psychology, University of Utah, remarks
made as a member of a panel discussion of the validity of the polygraph, American Polygraph Association Annual Seminar, Chicago,
Illinois (1972) , published in N. Ansley (Ed.). Legal Admissibility
of the Polygraph.
Appellant contends that in the circumstances of his case
it was a violation of due process for the state to refrain from
administering lie detector tests to Higgins and Kunzel whose testimony was effectively the sole evidence the state had against him
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certainly had as much if not more reason than appellant to fabricate.
POINT IX.

APPELLANT HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
APPEAL.
Under Article I Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah,

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have ... the right to
appeal in all cases.fT
Article VIII Section 4 of the our Constitution vests appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the district courts in this,
the Supreme Court of Utah.

The constitutional right of appeal is

the right to have this Court review the proceedings under which appellant was convicted in light of applicable law.

"It is the essen-

tial criterion of appellate jurisdiction, that it revises and corrects
the proceedings in a cause already instituted, and does not create
th.at cause;" Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
The law applicable to this case is stated in Article I Section 3
of the Constitution of Utah:
The state of Utah is an inseparable part of the
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United
States is the supreme law of the land. [Emphasis added],
which does nothing more than state Utah's fealty to Article VI paragraph 2 of the Federal Constitution:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any~tTTing m the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
•
About the foregoing general propositions there can be no question.
Nevertheless, a majority of this Court, in State v. Phillips, No.13816
in the Supreme Court of Utah (decided September 15, 1975) has stated
that it does not feel duty bound under the Supremacy Clause, to give
effect in Utah to the interpretations of the Federal Constitution rendDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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States;

The foregoing is said in awareness of the proliferations that have occurred on the First Ten Amendments,
and particularly by the use of the Fourteenth Amendment, to extend and engraft upon the sovereign states,
limitations intended only for the federal government.
This has resulted in a constant and seemingly endless
process of arrogating to the federal government more
and more of the powers not only not granted to it,
but expressly forbidden to it, and in disparagement
of the powers properly belonging to the soverign states
and the people. This development is a clear vindiction
of the forebodings of the founding fathers and their
fears of centralization of power. This was but natural
because of the conditions out of which our form of
government came into being and because history is
strewn with other examples which demonstrate that
undue, uncontrolled and unwieldy concentrations of
power in any individual or institution tends to destroy
itself. It is our opinion that this is the evil which
the founders feared so keenly and tried so zealously
to guard against, but which is now rife upon us.
It is plainly evident that it was their desire and
purpose to avoid this by providing for what they
believed to be an essential and desirable balance
of power between the sovereignties of the states and
the federal government.
Thus, the majority of this Court reserved to itself the role of
defining the meaning of the First Ten Amendments to the Federal
Constitution and determining the extent to which these protections
shall be afforded to the citizens of this state.

Concurring, Justice

Ellett stated in Phillips, a belief that the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution was never properly ratified, and that
the "Due Process Clause" thereof which has been the vehicle by which
the Supreme Court has wrongfully applied the strictures of the first
eight Amendments against the states, is invalid.

Even if the Four-

teenth Amendment is the law, he continues, the term "due process"
as it is used therein cannot include the other safeguards contained
in the Bill of Rights.
The undersigned would like nothing better than to engage
in academic debate with Justice Ellett about the logic and historical
foundations of his opinion,particularly insofar as they are supposedly
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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But, in

a brief already too long, there is no place for such historical

*

debate because it is, as a matter of law, irrelevant, even as Justice 1
Ellett!s opinions on the subject are irrelevant.
Article III Section 1 of the Constitution of the United
States

2

i

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
and establish
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
P Q t awhat
K l -i c h"The judicial Power11 is came within fifteen
Hot debate z\nf\
about

I
•

provision and an act of Congress, that statement simply means that

i
i
I
i
i

the Supreme Court is the sole arbiter of the meaning and effect

I

years of ratification in the context of judicial review.

Mr. Justice

Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)
uttered what is still the controlling definition:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.
Stated in a case presenting a conflict between a Constitutional

of the Federal Constitution.

Whether Marshall's holding conforms

argument that "Law, in its regular course of administration, through

i
i
i
i
i

the Courts of law, is due process of law, and, when it is secured

I

to the intent of the Framers or is merely an "arrogation" of power
is no longer at issue, for we have operated for one hundred and
seventy-two years on the assumption that it is a statement of binding
law.
Justice Ellett supports his argument in Phillips by citing
Hurtado, supra, decided in 1884.

In a brilliantly reasoned opinion

Mr. Justice Matthews, (in addition to laying to rest Justice Ellettfs

by the law of the state, the requirements of the Fourteentli Amendment
are satisfied."),
gave
states
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if they did
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not enact state procedure to protect fundamental liberties, the
Supreme Court would read the Due Process Clause broadly enough
to compel state compliance with minimum federal safeguards.
Hurtado, supra, also "held," at 236:
The principle and true meaning of the phrase [due
process] have never been more tersely or accurately
stated than by Mr. Justice Johnson, in Bank v.
Okely, 4 Wheat., 235-244:
"Xs to the words from Magna Charta ... after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the good sense of mankind has at last settled
down to this: that they were intended to secure the
individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers
of government, unrestrained by the established
principles of private right and distributive justice."
And the conclusion rightly deduced is, as stated
by Mr. Cooley, Const.Lim., 356:
"The principles, then, upon which the process
is based, are to determine whether it is fdue
process1 or not, and not any consideration of mere
form. ...[Rjemedial process may be changed from
time to time, but only with due regard to the Landmarks ejstahl i sJied for the p,ro±ecti QiL-_of tha^citJJIJLns.
[Emphas is added] ."
~~
~~~"~
The concurring Phillips opinion says that "since the day
of Lord Coke ... [due process of law] is said by him to denote
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men."

But after

noting that in 1176 the process of accusation was hedged with
some safeguards (the grand jury), but that accusation equaled
conviction because its result was that upon accusation the
accused was put to "ordeal by water," lost his hand and foot
at the same time if unsuccessful, and was banished even if he
succeded, Mr. Justice Matthews wisely observed, at 237:
[It is] better not to go too far back into antiquity
for the best securities of our ancient "liberties."
It is more consonant to the true philosopy of our
historical legal institutions to say that the spirit
of personal liberty, and individual right, which
they embodied, was preserved and developed by aT~
progressive growth and were adaptation to new circumstances and situations of the forms and processes
Tound fit to give, from time to time, new expression
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Over the next forty years of only half-hearted state effort to
guarantee nthose fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and policitcal institutions,1'
Hurtado, supra, Mr. Justice Matthews threat began to materialize
and the protections of the Bill of Rights began, slowly at first,1
to be applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Incorporation of the right to counsel - Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) - was really the commencement
of what this court complains of as being an ualmost unbelievable
arrogation of power by and to the federal government" in the area
of. criminal due process which continues to this very day.
We suppose that this process is thought by some to be
undemocratic.

Yet, democratic and constitutional procedures avail-

able to stem it have never been employed.
it is empowered to do

Congress has not, as

legislatively, significantly limited the

appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court anymore that it has
limited, as it is empowered to do, the jurisdiction of Federal
District Courts to issue writs of habeas corpus by which the "mischief" of the Supreme Court is emposed upon the states (as a practical matter).

Further, neither Congress nor the several states haAre

proposed for ratification a constitutional amendment which could
effectively limit the Federal Supreme Court to what a majority of
this Court views to be its proper business.

Thus, it appears, that

our democratic processes themselves have ratified what the Supreme
Court has done and is continuing to do, whether it has the right
to do it or not.
What is to be done?

The course of action taken by the

/1T1 TTrl

majorities in Kazdar ~aird""^hillips, supra, can only result in disaster
to our state.
At
opinions
can
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police and prosecutors that constitutional error is not looked upon

with sufficient disfavor by this Court to warrant the sanction of
reversal.

Thus, conduct which runs afoul of federal standards has

been effectively encouraged and will therefore continue.

The result

is inevitably the issuance of Federal writs of habeas corpus, the
right to which, cannot under the Federal Constitution, be suspended,
and which have the effect of wasting the taxpayers' money by undoing
costly criminal trials, liberating those convicted long after the
cases are cold and retrial often impossible, and encouraging criminals
in the pursuit of their business by removing the threat of sure,
swift, and final retribution.
Alternatively, this Court can recognize that guilt is
not a fact, but a process, and forge, upon the basis of our state
Constitution, a system of criminal jurisprudence so excellant that
it can in no way serve as the excuse for further federal intervention
in our affairs.
As things stand now appellant is effectively denied his
right to appeal by the present composition of this Court in that
certain Justices on the Court effectively refuse to apply the Supreme
Law of the land, i.e., United States Supreme Court pronouncements
as to what the Federal Constitution means.

On an appellate bench

of five members where four of the Justices often split evenly, a
controlling vote cast by a Justice who concurs in an opinion apparently for the sole purpose of deleting any reference to the Federal
Constitution is fatal.

Notwithdstanding that there can exist legiti-

mate philosophical and political disagreement about the relative
roles of the states and central government in our federal union,
appellant still wishes to remind this Court of the oath its Justices
swore upon assuming this bench:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support,
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and the Constitution of this State, and that I will
discharge the duties of my office with fidelity.
Article IV Section 10 of the Constitution of Utah
[Emphasis added].
Having done so, appellant contends that if this Court is unwilling
to review his conviction in light of the Supreme Law of the land,
there is no logical alternative but to order his immediate release. .
Failure to do so may result in even further Federal intervention
which, in the context of this issue, would be catastrophic.
CONCLUSION
There can be no legitimate question that constitutional
errors were committed during the investigation and trial of this
case, thus presenting three alternatives.

The errors can be ignored

in the face of overwhelming authority; the errors, considered
jointly or in light of their cumulative effect, can be ruled "harmless" as to their impact on the proceedings by which appellant
was convicted; or, the errors can be recognized and admitted, and
the conviction reversed.
Relying on Sec.77-42-1, Utah Code Annot.(1953) , as amended,
(which provides that "... error...shall not be presumed to have resulte
in prejudice.

The court must be satisifed that it has that effect

before it is warranted in reversing the judgment"), this Court has
not been hesitant to affirm convictions notwithstanding obvious
"irregularity or error" in the proceedings.

A recent example is

State v. Kazda, Supreme Court of Utah, No.13865 (9/22/75) in which
the conviction was affirmed on the basis that if there was error
it was harmless.

The majority opinion in Kazda fits into a pattern

which has become too common in state court criminal opinions.

Points

raised on appeal are disposed of without comment and often without
mention on the basis that they are "without merit," or errors are
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adiudged "harmless" because the appellant was otherwise obviously

guilty.

The danger in such reasoning and practice is that prosecu-

tors and police are effectively granted unrestrained licenses to
exceed what are acknowledged to be the permissible bounds, and
are then rewarded by having convictions obtained by impermissible
action affirmed.
committed.

If errors really are harmless they need not be

A tightening of the

!f

harmless error" rule, and appli-

cation of the sanction of reversal, the only available deterrent
to continued violation, is required if the integrity of Utah criminal
justice is to be maintained.
...[Fjastidious regard for the honor of the administration of justice requires the Court to make certain
that the doing of justice is so manifest that only
irrational or perverse claims of its disregard can be
asserted.
Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activists Control
Board, 351 U.S. 115, 100 L.Ed. 1003, 76 S.Ct. 663 (1955).
The concurring opinion in Kazda, supra, which applied
the controlling standard set forth in Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967), is a refreshing leap
in the direction of that end.

That standard, at 386 U.S. 24, is:

Certainly error, constitutional error, in illegally
admitting highly prejudicial evidence or comments,
casts on someone other than the person prejudiced
by it a burden to show that it was harmless. ... We,
therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of
our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis
added].
Notwithstanding that appellant has been sentenced to
concurrent terms of life imprisonment, he does not come before
this Court upon his knees asking that admitted criminal conduct
be effectively excused because of a gratuitous windfall of legal
error.

His conviction was had upon the unverified testimony of

two men who extricated
themselves from the shadow of prosecution
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for the very offense of which appellant was convicted by inculpating
him.

The physical evidence which, if their stories were true,

should have confirmed them, is contradictory at best.

Appellant

is therefore before this Court protesting his innocence and seeking
the review to which he is entitled, protesting, as an innocent man,
that his convictions are the very wrong sought to be avoided by
those who wisely created the constitutional protections here violated. Appellant contends that any one of the points raised herein
is, by itself, a sufficient ground for this Court to reverse his
conviction.

Their combined effect was devastating.

The state

was the beneficiary of evidence and inferences available to it
only by reason of violations -some subtle, some obvious and direct,
but all substantial - of his fundamental rights.

The state used

materials to construct a wall of stones which did not fit together
without the mortar of constitutional violation.

The state cannot

fairly prove its violations harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reverse his conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
MEREDITH, BARBER § DAY
By:
JAMES N. BARBER

By:

;

RICHARD M. DAY
Attorneys for Appellant
KENNETH LEE STANDROD
455 South Third East, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, fcSff^Vfcfc&Y PRECINCT,
COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST
OF A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES
AND PERSONS

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

)
)
)

DEPOSITION AND AFFIDAVIT OF
NORMAN SWAPP IN SUPPORT OF AND
PETITION FOR SEARCH WARRANT

)
: SS.
j

Personally appeared before, me t h i s _

/v//**
the deponent and a f f i a n t h e r e i n ,

day o f October, 1 9 7 3 ,

& hc>K

toasasr^frt^,

(5£fr

a Peace O f f i c e r andLAuiy

eloofcoidjSla&efefcg-of Kane County, who on o a t h , makes complaint and deposes
and says:

That he has and there i s probable and reasonable cause t o b e -

l i e v e , and he does b e l i e v e and there i s now on the premises located a t o r
near and described as t h a t c e r t a i n recreational home owned by Kenneth
Standrod, Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, Utah, the f o l l o w i n g
described property or things which consist o f items o r c o n s t i t u t e evidence
which tends t o show t h a t a felony has been committed, o r tends t o show
t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person has committed the felony o f MURDER.
and things s h a l l

The property

include:

One or more corpse buried upon said p r o p e r t y , l e t h a l weapons,
drugs, chemicals, blood s t a i n s , f i n g e r p r i n t s , f o o t p r i n t s ,
shovels o r tools used f o r the purposes o f burying b o d i e s ,
blood stained r u g s , c l o t h i n g and equipment.
Your a f f i a n t says t h a t the facts i n support o f the issuance o f

the Search Warrant are:
1.

_
_ ./
,> f , / /
O
f
A Sff* 0F -The l/r/}J? /Jf^'jr^Ay tsoTfe / ^
Your affiant is £5e dxaapfrfrsSga ^ K i ^ g ^ ^ s N ^ - S h s ^ f f of

Kane County, State of Utah, and has acted upon and received the information set forth in this affidavit in that eapacity.
2.

That on o r about the 2 1 s t day o f October, 1 9 7 3 , t h i s

affiant

received n o t i f i c a t i o n from a member o f the Las Vegas Police Department
t h a t a witness had reported t o them t h a t a murder had been commited i n
Kane County, State of Utah, on or about the 20th day o f October, 1 9 7 3 , a t
the mountain home o f Kenneth Standrod, a t Navajo Lake S u b d i v i s i o n , and
bodies had been buried upon said premises i n shallow graves; t h a t there
was present and p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n or witnessing s a i d homocide, Kenneth
Standrod, Candice Joy E a r l e , Layton Roseland, Robert F. H i g g i n s , and Paul
M. Kunzel.
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,
(

3. upon receiving the tiformation above enumerated, this affiant
and other police officers of the County of Kane proceeded to Navajo Lake
Subdivision, Kane County, Utah, and did there locate Kenneth Standrod, Canice
Joy Earle and Layton Roseland; that said named individuals at the time of
contact and after being advised of their rights, did voluntarily acknowledge
that two persons, to-wit: a male Indian known to them as Whitecloude,
and a female person whose name is now unknown, were killed in the home
herein described; that their bodies were buried in shallow graves located
upon property where the home is situated.
4. That your affiant has affixed his signature under oath to
this affidavit before the undersigned magistrate at the time and date
attested by said magistrate; that the elapsed time since facts reflected
herein have been discovered has been diligently utilized by your affiant
1n the mechanics of physically preparing these documents; locating and
consulting with Kane County Attorney, in reference to the preparation
thereof; locating the appropriate magistrate, and transporting these documents to the magistrate for his official action in connection therewith.
5. Your affiant has reasonable cause to believe that grounds
for the issuance of a Search Warrant exist, based upon the aforementioned
information facts and circumstances.
Your affiant prays that a.Search Warrant be issued based upon
the above facts, for seizure of such property or any part thereof, at
any time of the day or night, good cause being shown therefor, and that
the same be brought before the magistrate or retained subject to the
order of this Court, or of any other Court in which the property or
1

things or evidence is triable.
^ ^

/''

"

,

e V '^-;PC'
* "Hiri .tMtt^Wyp-

$£/*/• /SV^X.

Subscribed and swom-tb before me this > ^ ^ d a y of October, 1973,
at <3 f <?<? O ' c l o c k / ^ M.
'jyftite

vfi>? r-O* '.RECORD)

'•"•

- > - - - - ^ - ' ^
- . . • •/•
••/•> _ byrfr.-cJC o u r tW.
, Hunter/Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT IN AND FOR W^

Vtetgf PRECINCT,

COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST OF
A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES
AND PERSONS

STATE OF UTAH

SEARCH WARRANT

)
:

COUNTY OF KANE

)
}
)

SS.
)

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY SHERIFF, MARSHAL, POLICE OFFICER IN THE
COUNTY OF KANE OR ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH:
Proof by a f f i d a v i t and deposition jiaving been i h i s / d a y been made

j Q l C / ? / W UTzfrtfiyA>^ fL / j^C
before me WRfWHrVffffF, Kano C^un^=^^F¥ffr
t h a t there i s probable and
reasonable cause f o r the issuance o f a search warrant as set f o r t h i n
the a f f i d a u t attached hereto and made a p a r t hereof as i f f u l l y s e t f o r t h
h e r e i n ; you are hereby commanded to rake immediate search a t anytime o f
day or n i g h t , good cause being shown t h e r e f o r , o f the premises and property
described as:
. That c e r t a i n mountain home owned or purported to be owned by
Kenneth Standrod, Navajo Lake Subdivision, Kane County, Utah and the
land surrounding said home property f o r the f o l l o w i n g personal

property

or things which consist o f any items which c o n s t i t u t e evidence, tends t o
show t h a t the felony of homocide has been committed, or tends t o show
t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r person has committed said felony o r i e l o n i e s which items
shall

include:
One or more corpse buried upon said p r o p e r t y , l e t h a l weapons,
drugs, chemicals, blood s t a i n s , f i n g e r p r i n t s , f o o t p r i n t s ,
shovels or tools used f o r the purpese of burying bodies,
blood stained rugs, clothing and equipment.

arid i f you . f p d the same or any part t h e r e o f , to briqg i t

f o r t h w i t h before

/La-w^t)
me a t the Lferrg-^s^egr^Precinct, Kane County, Utah, or to any other court
in which the property or things taken i s t r i a b l e , or r e t a i n such property
i n your custody, subject to the f u r t h e r order of t h i s Court.
ISSUED UNDER MY HAND THIS _ ^ 2

r

DAY OF OCTOBER, 1973.

>y

7*4*. ^i *:v ^
Jjfe^ice of the Peace

-

/ f

is
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IN THE JUSTICE'S COURT, LONG VALLEY PRECINCT,
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH IN THE INTEREST
OF A WARRANT FOR SEARCH OF PREMISES
AND PERSONS

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF KANE

)
)
)

RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT

)
: SS.
)

I hereby c e r t i f y and r e t u r n , t h a t by v i r t u e o f the w i t h i n Search
Warrant t o me d i r e c t e d , I have searched f o r the goods and c h a t t e l s

therein

named, a t the place t h e r e i n described, and t h a t I have such goods and
c h a t t e l s before the Court, described as f o l l o w s :

I , Norman Swapp, the o f f i c e r by whom t h i s Warrant was executed,
do swear t h a t the abessF inventory contains a t r u e and d e t a i l e d account
o f a l l the property taken by me on the Warrant.

ifrman Swapp, Kane County SheiiLfcr ^ - 3

5^v«
Subscribed and sworn to before me this

<?* day of OcTOoer, 1973.

Y^rz^w
Justice of

•>•• y)

f-'y •;:::r:D>
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